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Jordanian – Palestinian relations are deeply rooted in history.  They date back to 
the first quarter of the twentieth century, to the period of British and French involvement 
in the region in the aftermath of World War I, and the establishment of the state of Israel 
in 1948. Since the early days of the British mandate, the two peoples, Jordanian and 
Palestinian, found themselves obliged to interact with each other due to geographic, 
social, economic and demographic considerations. Following the decision to unite the 
West Bank and Transjordan to make up the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1950, the 
West Bank and its people were in the process of integration within Jordan until war 
halted progress in 1967. This study presents the evolution of Jordanian – Palestinian 
relations through history. These relations have been both challenged by hardships and 
influenced by several other Arab states. The current peace process between the Israelis 
and Palestinians, which could bring about an independent Palestinian state, requires that 





































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE ........................................................................1 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND....................................................................1 
II. INVOLVEMENT AND STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINE.....................................15 
A. KING ABDALLAH’S DIPLOMACY TOWARD THE THREE 
MAIN ACTORS.............................................................................................18 
1. Great Britain ......................................................................................18 
2. The Jewish Agency.............................................................................19 
3. The Arab League................................................................................20 
B. THE KING MOVES TOWARD UNIFICATION OF THE TWO 
BANKS............................................................................................................22 
C. JORDAN’S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH EGYPT....................................29 
D. THE FIRST ARAB SUMMIT OPENS THE ROAD TO THE 
EMERGENCE OF NATIONAL PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP...........31 
E. COMPETING REPRESENTATIVES: THE PLO AND JORDAN .........33 
III. A NEW UNEXPECTED ERA OF CHANGE: 1967...............................................41 
A. JORDAN’S PRIORITIES AFTER THE 1967 WAR.................................44 
B. JORDAN’S CIVIL WAR: 1970-71 ..............................................................46 
C. THE UNITED ARAB KINGDOM PLAN: 1972.........................................52 
D. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY VS. JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN 
RELATIONS..................................................................................................55 
IV. JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1980s AND EARLY 
1990s ............................................................................................................................59 
A. PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AND THE PLO’S 
POLITICAL RISE.........................................................................................59 
B. PLO FRUSTRATION AND DIPLOMATIC OBSTACLES: 1974-
1984..................................................................................................................62 
C. HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT: FEBRUARY 1985 .........................67 
D. DISENGAGEMENT: 1988 ...........................................................................75 
E. PALESTINIANS UNDER THE JORDANIAN UMBRELLA AT THE 
MADRID PEACE CONFERENCE .............................................................80 
V. SCENARIOS FOR FUTURE RELATIONS...........................................................85 
A. THE CONFEDERATION SCENARIO: A PALESTINIAN OPTION ....86 
B. SEPARATION SCENARIO .........................................................................93 
1. Political Leadership ...........................................................................95 
2. Political Systems.................................................................................96 
3. Political Parties...................................................................................98 
4. Elites ....................................................................................................99 
5. Refugees ............................................................................................100 
6. Media and Public Opinion ..............................................................101 
7. Regional and International Factors ...............................................102 
viii 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................105 























I am grateful to Professor Anne Marie Baylouny for her insight and counter-
intuitive ideas during the process of writing this project--I am especially grateful that she 
is a Middle East expert, and someone who has a wide knowledge of the evolution of this 
region throughout history. I used some of Ms. Baylouny’s intellectual analyses in support 
of my project. I also want to thank Professor James Russell for his constructive ideas and 
remarks. In addition, I appreciate all the support I received from faculty members of the 
National Security Affairs Department for sharing their invaluable ideas and views. 
Lastly, I would like to express my deepest appreciation and gratitude for my family, 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
Jordanian-Palestinian relations have received much attention in the recent 
literature. This was especially true after Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) signed the first Oslo accord in 1993, and again after the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan reached its own bilateral agreement with Israel a year later. It is hoped that the 
resumption of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to an 
independent Palestinian state, or another form that is separate from Jordan. Jordanian-
Palestinian relations, however, still represent an unresolved issue in Jordanian politics. 
With these developments, the Jordanians, apparently, have sensed the need to restructure 
these relations. 
This work focuses on the dynamics of Jordanian-Palestinian relations; dynamics 
that could not be traced accurately apart from the historical context that sustained them. 
The two sides have yet to decide on the shape of their relations, awaiting the outcome of 
the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations before doing so. However, Jordanian-
Palestinian relations could reach either a confederation or separation on their own, 
without abandoning other formulas available to both sides. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The roots of Jordanian-Palestinian relations date back to the early twentieth 
century and the aftermath of the First World War. At that time, the British and French 
governments decided to partition and control the Arab world. Before then, most of the 
region had been part of the Ottoman Empire.  
Transjordan was a governorate under Syria. In the years preceding the First World 
War, the British government sought the aid of the Arab world in its revolt against the 
Ottomans. The Sharif Hussein, ruler of Hedjaz and keeper of the Holy Places of Mecca, 
realized the Ottoman weakness as early as 1914. He then established contact with the 
British in Egypt in order to rebel against the Ottomans in return for recognition of an 
Arab empire to be ruled by his dynasty. But the British did not commit themselves by 
making any guarantees or promises. In the meantime, the British were negotiating with 
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Arab nationalists, in Syria to revolt against the Ottomans. The Arabs were represented by 
the Young Arab Society. However, the British were hesitant to give the Arab nationalists 
any guarantees of independence. When the Ottoman Empire entered World War I it sided 
with the Germans. 
Sharif Hussein did not respond to the Ottoman Caliph’s call for holy war.  
However, the British wanted the Arab forces to be quickly drawn into the war quickly. 
The Sharif was, instead, looking to achieve the Arab aspirations of independence. The 
British exerted considerable pressure on the Sharif and the people of Hedjaz to enter the 
war. Accordingly, by mid-1915, Hussein started diplomatic talks with Sir Henry 
McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt. The Sharif-McMahon 
correspondence, which continued until early 1916, indicates that the British promised to 
consider Arab independence after the war. The Arab Great Revolt was announced on 
June 10, 1916. Hussein and his forces started the revolt against the Turks from Hedjaz, 
moved to Transjordan and then pushed north to Syria, where his son Faisal and Arab 
nationalists were conducting their fight in Syria.  
As the war ended in the defeat of Germany and its allies (the Central Powers), the 
victor countries started drawing the maps of the new areas acquired. Britain and France 
agreed to divide up the Arab world by conducting secret talks, culminated in the Sykes-
Picot Agreement on May 16, 1916. They divided the area into zones of influence –Britain 
got Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine; while France got Syria and Lebanon. On November 
2, 1917 the Balfour Declaration was issued, pledging British support for a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine. The Arabs were unaware that the British government, after 
promising to support Arab independence, had concluded two secret agreements that 
conflicted with Arab aspirations – the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour 
Declaration.1 
On July 24, 1922, Palestine was put under the “mandate” system, i.e., under 
British control, which specified that there would be a Jewish homeland inside Palestine, 
but that the rights of the native Palestinians would not be affected. However, the civil 
 
1 Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine. Brooklyn, New York: Olive Branch 
Press, 1983. 
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administration was established in Palestine on July 1, 1920, giving many British Zionist 
Jews key positions. The Arab opposition to the mandate therefore, refused to yield to 
what they perceived to be a broken promise. What ensued developed into violent riots 
between 1920 and 1939. 
On February 19, 1947 the British government terminated the mandate and handed 
the Palestine issue over to the United Nations. On November 29, 1947, the United 
Nations adopted the partition plan of Palestine between Arabs and Jews, whereas the 
cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem were given international status. Whereas the Arabs 
rejected the partition, the Jews accepted it, and on May 14, 1948 the Jewish state was 
established. 
Emir Abdullah Bin Sharif Hussein bin Ali arrived in Amman on March 2, 1921, 
leading an army of more than 2000 tribesmen, threatening to conquer Syria from French 
mandatory. The British dissuaded the Emir from taking any military actions or campaigns 
against the French. The Emir then campaigned in Transjordan and imposed the fait 
accompli that led the British to recognize him as ruler of Transjordan under supervision 
of the British High Commissioner in Palestine.  
As soon as Emir Abdullah set up his headquarters in Ma’an, a southern part of 
Jordan, he received a warm welcome from the inhabitants of Transjordan. This caused 
the British to realize that the popularity of the Emir would also strengthen his stand in his 
endeavor to rule Transjordan. Precipitating this realization, on September 2, 1920, before 
Abdullah’s arrival, a number of Transjordanian representatives met at Um Qays to voice 
their demands to the British government. These demands, along with the British 
response, gave rise to what were called the Um Qays Treaty.2  The Transjordanian’s 
urgent demand was for the establishment of an independent national government under 
the leadership of an Arab Emir, on condition that this government should in no way be 
connected with the government of Palestine. The Transjordanians realized how 
dangerous the Balfour Declaration was to the destiny of Palestine because it became a 
homeland for the Jews, causing them to insist on being part of an entity that was separate 
 
2 Adnan Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2003. 
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from that of Palestine. The early realization of this entity contributed to the formation of 
the Transjordanian identity that has been recognized and respected worldwide. Conscious 
of his popularity among the Transjordanian population, the British nominated the Emir to 
rule Transjordan as agreed between the Emir and Winston Churchill, the British Colonial 
Secretary, in Jerusalem on March 17, 1921. 
Because Transjordan and Palestine were administered under the same mandate, 
the British officials used both Amman and Jerusalem as centers of their administration, 
appointing Palestinian officials to work in Transjordan’s administration. The British sent 
units from the Arab Legion to maintain security in Palestine. Transjordan officials 
reported to British officials in Palestine, since the chief British mandate administrator and 
his staff were stationed there. Trade and business relations between people of both 
countries started to flourish, the interaction increasing considerably after the Emir 
disclosed his concern about the Palestinian question.  
Following the Churchill-Abdullah agreement in late March 1921, the British took 
certain measures in order to give Transjordan a legal status. The British authorities 
disjoined Transjordan from the provisions of the mandate. Accordingly, Transjordan was 
put under a separate administration with clearly defined borders. 
As a result of negotiations held in October 1922 between the Emir and the British 
government representative, Sir Herbert Samuel, the British Commissioner of Palestine 
announced on April 25, 1923 that subject to the approval of the League of Nations, his 
government would recognize the existence of an independent government in Transjordan 
under the rule of Emir Abdullah.3  The Emir started working with his political aides and 
British advisers to lay the foundation of the new administration in Jordan. In April 1923, 
the first government was formed, and a consultative council was renamed four months 
later. On May 15, 1923, within the context of a treaty between the fledgling state and 
Britain, Jordan was declared independent. Britain retained control over Jordan’s military 
and foreign policy, as well as its budgetary supervision. 
 
3 Naseer H. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965). The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1972. 
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Britain and Transjordan took a further step in the direction of Jordanian self-
government in 1928, when they agreed to a new treaty that relaxed British controls, while 
still providing for British oversight on financial matters and foreign policy.4  They agreed 
to promulgate a constitution called the Organic Law. Then, in 1929, a legislative council 
was installed in the place of the old executive council. In 1934, a new agreement with 
Britain allowed the Emir to set up consular representation in Arab countries.5 
The Arab Legion was further organized by British officers under the command of 
F. G. Peake, eventually becoming highly effective under the command of Peake’s 
successor in 1939, General John Baghot Glubb. 
The Emir was an ally of Britain during World War II, as his father had been 
during World War I. Units of the Arab Legion served effectively alongside British forces 
in 1941, overthrowing the pro-Nazi regime led by Rashid Ali that had taken power in 
Iraq. However, in so doing, the Emir was still hoping that his dream of building a greater 
Syria under his dynasty would come true. During the World War II years, the Emir 
participated in the inter-Arab preliminary meetings that led to the formation of the Arab 
League in Cairo in March 1945. 
In March 1946, the British-Transjordanian treaty signed in London declared the 
independence of Jordan whereby Jordan was granted the status of being a fully sovereign 
state. Transjordan was then proclaimed to be a kingdom, adopting a new constitution to 
replace the 1928 Organic Law. 
Due to Arab rejection of the Balfour Declaration, coupled with the Jewish 
migration to Palestine and the aggressive spirit of the Jewish armed organizations toward 
the Arabs, many massacres against the Arab Palestinians took place at different periods 
of time from 1920-1947. Because the British authorities realized the huge amounts of 
resources and large number of troops were necessary to maintain peace, in 1947 they 
decided to present the Palestinian problem to the UN.6 
 
4 Helen Chapin Metz, Jordan: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress, December 1989. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Hadawi, BitterHarvest.  
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During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Arab Legion fought better than other 
forces in defense of Palestine, and was able to secure the West Bank and part of 
Jerusalem from imminent Jewish occupation. The war resulted in the migration of more 
than half a million Palestinians to the East Bank of Jordan. This migration later brought 
about a change in the demographic and political structure of the country whose 
population, at the time, was about a half million. On December 1, 1948, the Palestinian 
and Transjordanian delegates favored the joining of Palestine with Jordan to form the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as agreed upon in the Jericho meeting.  
The Palestinian-Jordanian early relations and contacts took place during the 
British mandate, at which time the Palestinian middle class flourished and became 
skillful civil servants, often being sent to Jordan to provide civil service to the 
bureaucracy.7. Unlike the Palestinians, the Transjordanians had neither developed a 
middle class, nor formed a practical proletariat. The civil servants were generally 
Palestinians, Circassians, and Syrians, who had all come to Jordan after the demise of 
King Faisal’s government in Syria in 1920 at the hands of French imperialists. The 
Palestinian civil servants staffing the Transjordan bureaucracy (who became powerful in 
implementing policies and in governance), along with the large number of immigrants 
who moved to the country after the war of 1948, opened the door for closer relations 
among Transjordanians and Palestinians having different identities and different 
allegiances. 
Since the Great Arab Revolt of 1916, led by Sharif Hussein Bin Ali against the 
Ottoman Empire, the Hashemites have been associated with the federal notion of the 
establishment of an Arab state. Partly in response to this, a confederation had been sought 
by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. However, it should be noted that the majority of 
Arabs have, without discrimination, favored the confederalist option toward Arab unity.8  
However,  hot  debates  have  taken  place  in  the  Arab  world  over  the best approach to  
 
 
7 Aruri, Jordan. 
8 Kamal S. Salibi, A Modern History of Jordan. London: I. B. Tauris, 1993. 
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achieve such a unity. The revolutionary approach did not succeed in persuading 
Jordanian public opinion, so its leadership chose to be cautious, working toward 
unification more gradually. 
On the one hand, the collusion between Britain and France and local Arab leaders 
created religious tension and national separatist forces in Arabia, Egypt and Syria. On the 
other hand, the confederational scheme was imposed from the outside to the dislike of a 
majority of the Arab populace at the time. In the wake of World War I, after government 
in Arab regions had been formalized with the imposition of the political and territorial 
arrangements of the colonial powers, a confederation was institutionalized in 1945 by the 
adoption of the charter of the League of Arab States.9 
The Hashemites stuck to their federal idea. King Abdullah, the founder of the 
modern state of Jordan, pursued it as he tried to unite Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and 
Syria into a single entity. However, his efforts only succeeded in Palestine, being rejected 
by other pro-confederacy Arabs. After a time of political and military struggle between 
the Israelis, the British (along some Arab countries), he managed to unite Jordan and the 
West Bank in 1950.   
The annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and the assassination of King Abdullah 
by four young Palestinians in 1951 both played important roles in hastening the initial 
democratization of the political system in Jordan.10  The direct effect of these two events 
was to transfer the power from one king to the palace group, an entity created by the 
annexation of the West Bank. The migration of more than half a million Palestinians to 
Jordan after the 1948 war transformed Jordanian society by giving it a relatively well-
trained middle class, along with a higher rate of urbanization.  
The Palestinians expressed their will to participate in politics, demanding that the 
prevailing patriarchal system be exchanged for a parliamentary democracy, as had been 
previously promised. They had to deal with the powerful palace politician group, whose 
 
9 For more, see Bruce Maddy-Weizman, The Crystallization of the Arab State System: 1945-1954. 
Syracuse University Press, 1993. 
10 Abdullah was assassinated by a young Palestinian on July 20, 1951 as he was entering the Mosque 
of Omar in Jerusalem for the Friday prayer. 
8 
prominence increased after the assassination of King Abdullah. However, the priority 
during this time was given to the succession of King Abdullah and the future of the 
country. 
Crown Prince Talal, who had been under medical treatment abroad, was 
proclaimed king as the legitimate heir to the throne. This refuted rumors that Amir Nayef, 
the Regent who aspired to unite with Iraq under the Hashemite crown, would be the king. 
Such rumors provoked both internal and external oppositionthat Syria and Saudi Arabia 
be included. Tawfiq Abul-Huda, a prominent person among the palace group, presided 
over the Cabinet and skillfully managed the crisis resulting from the assassination, but 
particularly the succession problem. On September 4, 1951 the Jordanian Cabinet 
unanimously agreed that Prince Talal be proclaimed king, and that Prince Hussein, his 
son, be crown prince.  
A new constitution was promulgated on January 2, 1952, making the Prime 
Minister and his Cabinet accountable to the House of Representatives. The constitution 
was very democratic, making the king a constitutional monarch, and allowing the people 
and their representatives to participate in the political system and monitor executive 
authority. 
The unification of the two banks led to a change in the legislative branch of the 
government, increasing the deputies’ seats in the House of Representatives from 20 to 40, 
thereby giving equal representation to the two banks. Political parties were formed, while 
opposition parties came into existence. Due to Talal’s illness and inability to rule 
properly, Crown Prince Hussein returned to Jordan and was inaugurated as king of Jordan 
on May 2, 1953. His brother Hassan was eventually named crown prince when he was 16 
years old.  
King Hussein inherited a country that was becoming unstable and highly 
politicized, under pressure from Palestinians due to their greater complications and 
grievances. However, the monarchy was exposed to the most intense pressures during the 
1950s and 1960s. By mid-1950s, political parties flourished and opposition groups and 
parties formed, such as the Communist and the Baath Parties (i.e., the Syrian-centered 
Socialist Pan-Arab Party). The country was characterized by having a highly permeable 
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society, being in the early stages of its political development and, therefore, susceptible to 
outside influence (i.e., to having its political strings pulled from outside Jordan).11  The 
Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser’s radio propaganda aroused the Palestinians in 
Jordan to demonstrate against the Hashemites’ relations and connections with the West, 
especially with Britain.12  Also, the Egyptian and Syrian regimes were able to mobilize 
and incite the Palestinian and Arab nationalists to take to the streets in Jordan in 1955, 
contesting Hussein’s intentions to join the US and British-sponsored Baghdad Pact 
against Soviet expansion in the region.13 
The Jordanian government incorporated many different, flexible measures in 
order to deal with the increasingly hostile environments, especially in the West Bank, 
where most demonstrations took place at the hands of opposition parties. Security forces 
were used to counter the tactics of infiltration, harassment and punishment used by 
subversive groups. Extremists and activists were dealt with harshly. For example, 
students might be expelled from schools, prevented from traveling abroad for study, or 
denied re-entry after studying abroad. Opposition parties were harassed and punished and 
some were imprisoned, while parties that supported the government were rewarded.14 
The freest elections to that time in Jordan were conducted in October 1956, 
marking the first determined democratic move in the history of Jordan. An opposition 
party, namely the National Socialist Party, won the elections and formed a government 
headed by Suleiman Nabulsi. The newly formed government took immediate steps 
toward shifting Jordan’s orientation from its traditional British ties to a more pro-Egypt 
and pro-Syria stance. The Tripartite Aggression on Egypt came almost a week after the 
formation of the government. 
In 1957, the throne was again exposed to a crisis when a group of military 
officers, calling themselves the Free Officers, plotted to overthrow the king.  Immediately 
 




14 Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank Under the Jordanian Regime 1949-1967. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1982, pp.239. 
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following this event, the palace was shaken when the parliament demanded that the king 
be accountable to it .As a result, the king decided to put an end to the conditions that 
would undermine his powers by banning political parties and declaring martial law. It 
was at this time that parties took their work underground, thereby causing the kingdom to 
be kept under stricter martial law until 1991.  
In 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was created by the Arab 
League Summit. Soon after, this organization, along with the Fatah movement, 
established earlier, launched its guerrilla operations against Israel from Jordanian 
territory. Israel retaliated in response to these attacks, the efforts to prevent the guerrilla 
attacks being regarded as anti-Palestinian. If guerrilla attacks were not prevented, leading 
to Israeli retaliation, the Jordanian army, in turn, was criticized for not protecting 
Palestinian camps and villages. In 1966, Jordan banned the PLO, an action that led to 
border clashes with Syria. 
Soon after, another event shocked the region: the Six-Day War that resulted in the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai 
Peninsula. A new wave of Palestinians, particularly those residing in refugee camps in 
the West Bank and Gaza, were forced to flee, yet again, from what was left of historical 
Palestine. They sought shelter in countries such as Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. 
Jordan, alone, received more than 300,000 new Palestinian immigrants.15  At this point 
the Jordanian demographic structure was transformed, tipping the balance in favor of a 
Palestinian majority. Today, Palestinians in Jordan, most of whom were granted 
citizenship in the early 1950s, represent over half of the Jordanian population. Beyond 
mere changes in the demographics, the influx of refugees into Jordan reshaped its 
political, socioeconomic and cultural life. The government had to adapt its policies to 
accommodate the new populations. However, the fact that Jordanian citizenship has been 
granted to Palestinians in Jordan since 1950 has not cancelled the Palestinian right of 
return and their status as refugees.  
After 1967, the PLO embraced Fatah, and other Palestinian groups started to 
operate from Jordan, despite the government ban. The PLO attacks on Israel brought 
11 
                                                
continuous Israeli retaliatory actions across the Jordan River, which resulted in the 
departure and fleeing of Jordanian farmers from rich land to the nearby villages and hills, 
thereby creating new economic difficulties for the country. The PLO became very 
powerful in Jordan, developing its base of operations against Israel. Also, it gradually 
established an authority that rivaled that of the Jordanian government. The situation 
became intolerable for the Jordanian government and its army, which led to the 1970 
civil war, and eventually to the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan to Syria and Lebanon. 
King Hussein, once again, became the sole ruler in Jordan after the expulsion of the PLO. 
In 1988, King Hussein announced the administrative separation between Jordan 
and the West Bank, sparking an economic crisis in the country. However, the Hashemites 
have not halted their support and efforts at all regional and international tribunals, 
presumably in order to highlight the Palestinians’ sufferings (and their just cause that 
needs a fair, comprehensive and permanent settlement). The dynamic of Jordanian-
Palestinian relations took a new turn following the first Gulf War in 1991, when Jordan 
included Palestinians under the Jordanian umbrella during the Madrid Peace Conference.  
These relations were further disconnected when the Palestinians signed the 1993 Oslo 
Accord with Israel, preceded by secret talks between both parties without informing 
Jordan, who preferred to be included in the talks in order to address Jordanian interests, 
such as the right of return for the refugees.16 
Jordan reached its own bilateral peace agreement with Israel in 1994. In the Oslo 
II Accord of 1995, the Palestinian National Authority was established. However, 
Palestine was still linked by history, economics, and political, social and family ties with 
its neighbors in Israel and Jordan. For this reason, a Palestinian-Jordanian-Israeli triangle 
is a strong possibility for the future. Both Jordan and Palestinians have addressed certain 
issues  and conducted separate dealings with Israel on a bilateral basis. However, it seems  
 
15 Samir A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
16 Mustafa Hamarneh, Jordanian-Palestinian Relations: Where To?  London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1997. 
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that the Palestinians are in no hurry to structure their relations with Jordan, waiting for a 
breakthrough in the often stalemated negotiations with Israel to see how the final 
arrangement with Israel will look.  
The absence of a formal agreement for Jordanian-Palestinian relations creates the 
likelihood that events relative to Palestinian-Israeli relations, rather than policy decisions, 
will dictate possibilities for their future. Many events have already taken place since Oslo 
II that further hampered Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The most painful blow directed 
at Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts was the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin in November 1995 by an Israeli anti-peace activist. Also, the increase in 
Palestinian suicide bombers, the incessant Israeli retaliation to these bombings, and the 
recent new Israeli separation wall erected by Sharon have all complicated the situation 
even more, putting many other impediments on the road to both peace and regional 
security. 
The Jordanian-Palestinian relationship is multi-faceted. For example, it is a 
relationship between two different peoples (i.e., Jordanian and Palestinian Arabs) on 
either side of the Jordan River, citizens and residents within Jordan itself; and two 
different types of leadership and their respective governing bodies. The relationship 
between the two peoples permeates the contemporary debate about identity in Jordan.17  
The arrival date of Palestinians to Jordan is considered the most appropriate criteria to 
identify those who have become more assimilated, with the exception of refugees in 
camps who are still waiting for the day of their return home, or for compensation, 
according to UN Resolution 242.  Since the establishment of the P.A. official talks 
between the two entities have taken place in the manner more appropriate for state-to-
state relations than previously. Even the late King Hussein followed the expected 
protocol for meetings and receptions, as does his successor, King Abdullah II. Still, their 
future relations are somewhat unclear.  
Awaiting a breakthrough in their often stalemated peace talks with Israel, 
Palestinians have not yet decided on the shape of their relations with Jordan. Specifically, 
 
17 Laurie A. Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity.” Journal of Palestine Studies, 
vol. 24, no.4, Summer 1995. 
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if the Palestinians succeed in establishing a sovereign state Jordan may decide to 
maintain and develop their existing relations (i.e., coordinating their efforts to create a 
new confederacy style of relationship, or disengage and cut past relations.)  Having no 
clear vision of how to define Palestinians’ relations with Jordan, it is difficult for either 
side to know how to proceed now. But the external observer might deduce from the PA 
policy that the Palestinians are seriously looking forward to establishing a separate state. 
Jordan encourages the Palestinians to discuss such relations in order to be better prepared 
for future possible outcomes. 
As for relations between individual people, the Palestinians in Jordan cannot be 
categorized as one bloc, in terms of how they identify themselves, i.e., as Jordanian 
citizens or Palestinian subjects in Jordan with Jordanian citizenship, people who live 
according to their own preferences. If people have a choice, some would prefer to be 
totally assimilated into Jordan, while others would like to reside in Jordan as Palestinian 
nationals. Still others might choose to be relocated to Palestine whenever conditions 
become appropriate. In the same way, East Bankers also vary in their particular stands on 
the options for Palestinians. Some extremist, chauvinists adopted an anti-Palestinian 
stand, often seen waving such slogans as “Jordan for Jordanians.”  Because the majority 
of East Bankers prefer to retain their status as the majority-population, many people fear 
that Jordan might become an alternative homeland for Palestinians. This, they argue, will 
create such an imbalanced status against them that it has increasingly become a matter of 
deep concern to Jordanians. Recently, East Bankers see that their identity is at risk, and 
some believe that the Jordanian identity is being diluted due to the density of the 
Palestinian population among them. East Bankers depend on the “Jordanization” of the 
Jordan Arab Army and security services in order to compensate for the demographic 
imbalance, thereby hoping to ensure the continuation of the Jordanian entity and 
precedence over all other issues. The Jordanian government’s new slogan, “Jordan First,” 
has increased the animosity between Jordanians and Palestinians, reducing the people’s 
sympathy. This is especially true among the East Bankers in Palestine, although the intent 














































                                                
II. INVOLVEMENT AND STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINE 
Transjordan and Palestine were administered under the same mandate. They were 
often treated by the British government as one integrated region, having two banks on the 
River of Jordan. The Emir’s role in Palestine was elevated when the Peel Commission, in 
1937, proposed uniting the Arab part of Palestine with Transjordan. This proposal was 
the first attempt to involve Transjordan as a country in solving the Palestine-Jewish 
conflict. The Emir’s role was further enhanced when Transjordan, along with the 
Palestinian Higher Arab Committee (HAC) and other Arab countries, participated in the 
1939 meeting held in London to discuss the issue. 
As the Emir’s position was strengthened in the 1930s, he became a significant 
player in the region, thus encouraging some Palestinian notables who did not accept the 
political leadership of the Mufti to turn their allegiance to Emir Abdallah.18  The 
Palestinian notables believed that the Emir primary reason for appearing when he did was 
to provide the solution to their political rivalry. These notables were moderates and 
closely tied to the British administration, Ragheb Nashashibi of Jerusalem being among 
them. They saw in Abdallah a moderate man who could solve their conflict with the Jews 
in Palestine. They found out that the British support to Emir would be advantageous to 
them. Thus, these notables were overjoyed when Emir took them as his allies, developing 
good friendships with them, and believing they would assist him if he deemed it 
necessary.  
A treaty with the British in March 1946 made Transjordan an independent state – 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In May, the Amir became king. However, the British 
retained control of the Arab Legion and provided a substantial annual subsidy. Due to the 
continued British connection, many countries did not recognize the kingdom’s 
independence, and the Soviet Union blocked its admission to the United Nations. The 
country was admitted to the United Nations in 1954. 
 
18 Mufti: An Islamic nickname given to Haj Amin al-Husseini, appointed Grand Muslim Council in 
1927. 
16 
Abdallah continued to express the Hashemite ambition for creating a greater 
empire. For example, he dreamed of establishing greater Syria under his rule. As it 
became clear to him that his dreams were not likely to be achieved, his ambitions went in 
a new direction, leading him to keep a covetous eye on the Palestine Mandate and the 
development of events there. Palestine was able to lure Abdallah from his desert kingdom 
because it had a far richer area, with vastly evergreen farmlands and active trade. 
Palestine also contained Jerusalem, having the Islamic’s first direction and third holiest 
shrine (after the two Emir’s family left in the Hijaz), as well as being the world’s 
religious center.  
Abdallah’s characteristics and commitment, unquestionably, contributed to 
Jordan’s involvement in Palestine’s affairs. However, such qualities, alone, as important 
as they were, cannot explain entirely a country’s foreign policy. It is likely that the Emir 
also understood the geo-strategic factors and their effect on a small country with scarcity 
of resources and capabilities such as Jordan. 
The mandate made it clear that Jordan would be a part of the independent 
federation agreed upon in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondences, separate from the 
Belfour arch. However, it did not exempt Jordan from complying with some of its 
demands. For example, Jordan was required to help prevent the infiltration of armed 
groups into Palestine, which served to worsen the Jordanians’ relations with both the 
Palestinians and the Arabs at different times. The king’s enduring relations and 
cooperation with the British saved Jordan from experiencing the same fate as Palestine 
had. However, Jordan was influenced by the pitfalls and convulsions that resulted from 
the Arab-Jewish struggle over Palestine.  
The mandated political order put both Jordan and Palestine in terms as interrelated 
“twins,” bound by historical relationships between the two peoples. The Hashemite link 
in the relations between the two banks has evolved around their racial homogeneity. The 
Hashemites sought to include this unity as part of their federal notion of Arab unity. The 
Arabs, including the Palestinians, were not opposing the Hashemites over their leanings 
towards the British, but were opposing them because of British federal plans that had 
been unfavorable to Arabs seeking power in their countries. The Arabs had also 
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encountered the French and Jewish plans for the region. The Hashemite link catapulted 
the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship into the midst of the intense struggle already being 
waged in the Arab world between the followers of the federal school of thought, on the 
one hand, and the beneficiaries of the confederacy on the other.19 
Realizing the dangers evolving in the Zionist-Arab struggle over Palestine, and its 
probable impacts on both Jordan and Palestine, King Abdallah became convinced that the 
Zionist, expansionist aspirations could not be halted, as the Arab leaders had claimed. 
Consequently, he decided to form an interventionist policy toward the Palestinian 
question. Jordan was obliged to intervene in Palestine’s affairs for concerns that were 
past, present, and future.  As far as the present and future were concerned, its security and 
stability, as well as the people’s welfare and economic standards, could not be separated 
from the present and future of Palestinian history. As to the past, events showed the 
inseparable linkage between the Jordanians and Palestinians. 
Having grasped all the issues pertaining to the Palestinian question, the king saw 
that the Arabs should make peace with the Jews at the earliest possible opportunity. In 
doing so, he considered the role of the international community in establishing a 
homeland for the Jews in Palestine, as well as the empirical fact of the Jews’ existence, 
aside from passion or emotion. If the Arabs had followed suit, they might have been able 
to dictate their own terms with regard to the Jews, since the Arabs had had an upper hand 
in the early stages of the conflict. 
The king’s interventionist strategy in Palestine explained his political vision of the 
conflict. This strategy was based on three pillars: first, the relations with Palestine had 
been unique and inseparable in terms of their bearing on the peoples’ happiness or 
despair; second, that the Arabs should not isolate themselves from dealing and 
cooperating with the British, whose support would be critical and effective for the Arab 
anti-Zionist strategy; third, that showing a degree of flexibility toward the Jews’ plans 
would serve the Arab cause better than would total rejection or denouncing of Israel’s 
right to exist (something which could not be denied, anyway). 
 
19 Braizat S. Musa, The Jordanian-Palestinian Relationship: The Bankruptcy of the Confederal Idea. 
London: British Academic Press, 1998, p. 35. 
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Realizing the British inclination for the partition of Palestine in the late 1930s, the 
Emir found that his aspirations toward expansion and annexation of new lands would fit  
in with British plans. Therefore, he worked to build political support with moderate 
Palestinian families against his strong adversary, Haj Amin, Mufti of Jerusalem.20 On 
November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted the partition of Palestine, which 
led to the establishment of an Arab and a Jewish state, whereby Jerusalem was 
internationalized. Even though the plan was adopted internationally and accepted by the 
Jews, it was rejected by the Arabs. The Emir and the Palestinian moderate camp were 
both disappointed by the Palestinian High Arab Committee’s position in rejecting the 
partition plan.21  They preferred the rejection to the mufti’s failure to grasp the realities in 
Palestine and on the international scene. 
As the British mandate in Palestine was approaching its end in 1947, King 
Abdallah’s involvement in Palestine and with its future became more urgent. Whereas the 
partition plan had paved the road for the expansion of his realm to become a tangible 
reality, still he felt the danger that others might resist him in taking control in Arab 
Palestine after the British departure. Consequently, King Abdallah put the incorporation 
of the Arab part into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as his first priority. To achieve 
this goal, he had to seek the support of the three main actors: the British government, the 
Jewish Agency and the Arab League. 
A. KING ABDALLAH’S DIPLOMACY TOWARD THE THREE MAIN 
ACTORS 
1. Great Britain 
Following the partition plan, the British strategy intended to formulate a system of 
security alliances separately with each of the important Arab states. Under the new 
system Egypt, Iraq and Jordan would be recognized as completely independent and 
sovereign states. Britain saw that its strategic interests would be preserved through the 
extension of Abdallah’s kingdom to include parts of the country.22 
 
20 Day, East Bank/West Bank. 
21 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom, p. 29. 
22 Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition 
of Palestine. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 130-131. 
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British intentions converged with King Abdallah’s plan, since both sides were at 
odds with the Mufti, and did not welcome his return to Palestine. The king wanted 
assurances and commitment from the British, so he dispatched his prime minister, Tawfiq 
Abul-Huda, to London to meet the British authorities. Abul-Huda referred to the British-
Jordanian Treaty, which had settled upon Transjordanian independence the previous year, 
emphasizing that the two parties could count on the other’s support should a threatening 
situation arise. Abul-Huda declared that upon the British departure from Palestine, a 
vacuum of power would exist. He believed that the powerful, well-organized Jewish 
organizations and army would overcome the disorganized, ill-equipped, and poorly 
trained Palestinians and, thus, would occupy the whole of Palestine without any 
consideration of the UN partition plan. Eventually, the two sides agreed to send the Arab 
Legion across the Jordan River. Moreover, Palestinian notables sent a petition to the king 
requesting his protection from the Jews and Al-Mufti militia upon the British departure.  
Soon, Abul-Huda’s predictions came true – bloody confrontations between Jews 
and Palestinians took place, while the Jewish armed organizations, such as Haganah and 
the Stern gang, perpetrated massacres on some Palestinian villages. The situation in 
Palestine deteriorated, causing the Palestinians to seek help and rescue from the Arab 
states. 
2. The Jewish Agency 
Due to international developments after World War II, especially the European 
refusal to accommodate the Jews in their own countries, on one hand, and their sympathy 
with them, on the other, King Abdallah became more convinced than before that the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was inevitable. His prediction became true 
when the UN partition plan was issued. Thus, it appeared that any attempts from the Arab 
states to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state would end in failure. He rationally 
decided to reconcile Jordanians’ and Palestinians’ interests with the interests of the Jews, 
in his merger plan of Arab Palestine. His aspiration was that Jordan would have an outlet 
to the sea from which he would be an active member of the Mediterranean community. 
He revealed his plan to the Jewish Agency who, like the British, preferred to deal with 
King Abdallah, rather than the Mufti. They also opposed the idea of establishing a 
Palestinian state. 
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The Palestinians, as confrontation with the Jewish armed organizations continued, 
became unable to defend their land in 1948, and the refugees started to migrate forcibly 
from their land. King Adbullah tried to reach an agreement with the Jews by employing 
his own diplomacy, attempting to bring a peace to the region that would take into account 
Arab demands. Moreover, he offered the Jews proposals that might constitute the basis 
for reaching a peaceful settlement. The gist of these proposals can be summed up in the 
following:23 
1. Palestine would remain undivided, with autonomy for the areas where Jews 
predominate; 
2. This arrangement would be left for one year, after which time the country 
would be joined with Transjordan; 
3. There would be one parliament in which Jews would be allotted 50% of the 
seats; 
4. There would be a cabinet in which the Jews would be represented (no mention 
of the percentage). 
3. The Arab League 
The Arab League was an obstacle to the king’s plan for Palestine. It had chosen 
Mufti as the representative of the Palestinian people. The Jews refused to deal with him, 
therefore his nomination to represent the people effectively blocked the channels in 
which he conflict with the Jews might be solved t before resorting to war. The negative 
traits of the Mufti often displayed themselves in the Arab League, thereby adversely 
influencing the collective Arab action toward Palestine.24 
Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia were against King Abdullah’s efforts to annex 
Arab Palestine as part of his so called dynasty. On the contrary, these countries were 
supporting Al-Mufti, hoping that he might become the ruler of Arab Palestine. 
Nevertheless, these countries did not take a stand against the king, fearing that such a 
 
23 Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace 
Process. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999. 
24 Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace 
Process. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999. 
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stand would make him withdraw from the Arab League. Also, these countries were aware 
of the strength of the Arab Legion, and would not risk losing it as a professional force if 
they had to fight a war in Palestine. The Arab League, at that time, was ineffective and 
unable to adopt a mutually agreed upon policy. At a meeting of the Arab League in 
October 1947, Jordan was able to pre-empt a proposal made by the anti-Hashemite camp 
to form a government in Palestine headed by the Mufti. 
In a meeting of the political committee of the Arab League on April 10, 1948, the 
Jordanian delegation emphasized that the king had made his decision to intervene 
militarily to protect Palestinian interests. Syria and Lebanon called for the formation of 
an Arab task force to enter and occupy Palestine as soon as the British withdrew, instead 
of fighting individually. Egypt agreed, but first made a demand that the Arab League 
announce that Palestinians would be free to choose the form of government they liked. 
The Egyptian demand was against the king’s goal of annexing the Arab part of Palestine. 
Furthermore, while the committee was in session the king sent a message to the meeting 
in which he vowed to rescue Palestine. The committee sent a response back to the king 
thanking him for his offer, and at the same time took the necessary measures to allow the 
Arab Legion to operate in such a way as to liberate the Arabs in Palestine and prevent 
any more massacres from taking place. In this case, the king secured the Arab League’s 
political approval to become involved in Palestine, considering this approval to be a 
victory over the Mufti. The Palestinians, who were suffering brutality at the hands of the  
Jewish armed organizations, welcomed the king. The king’s position in Palestine 
strengthened as he shouldered the burden of stopping the Jewish aggression against the 
Palestinians. 
On April 19, 1948, the Arab League made a decision to go to war in Palestine, 
naming King Abdullah as a general commander of the Arab forces. Egypt, Syria, 
Lebanon and Iraq, in addition to the Arab Legion, were allocated specific operational 
duties. The Jewish state escalated their level of aggression toward the Palestinians as the 
British evacuation approached its deadline of May 15, 1948. 
The British withdrawal touched off the conflict, which had been anticipated. 
There had been, in fact, some fighting for several months between Jews and Palestinians. 
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On May 15, 1948, on the very day of the British withdrawal, Arab forces joined the war. 
On the morning of May 15, the Arab Legion, together with a small Iraqi unit, moved 
across the Jordan valley into the West Bank, occupying most of it. The Legion moved 
further to Ramleh and Lydda. The Egyptians advanced from the south, and Syrians and 
Lebanese moved across northern borders. 
The Arab Legion was obliged under Jewish pressures to withdraw from Ramleh, 
Lydda and a strip of land along the western flank of the West Bank, depriving many 
farmers of their fields, and it remains a point of contention today. Palestinian bitterness 
against King Abdallah deepened, seeing such withdrawals as concessions to the Jews’ 
expansionist desires. The Arab armies made progress at first, but the truces they accepted 
gave the Jewish forces the opportunity to organize, strengthen, and retain the initiative. 
By the end of the was in 1949, Israel had occupied substantially all of Palestine except 
for the West Bank, held by Jordan, and the Gaza Strip, held by Egypt.25 
B. THE KING MOVES TOWARD UNIFICATION OF THE TWO BANKS 
Realizing the king’s intention to annex the West Bank because it was held and 
controlled by his troops, in September 1948 the Arab League moved to undermine his 
efforts. It established an all-Palestinian government in Gaza, headed by the Mufti of 
Jerusalem, to be the legitimate representation government for all Palestinians. King 
Abdallah moved quickly to abort this move by organizing a Palestinian Congress of his 
supporters, held in Amman on October 1. The Congress rejected the Gaza government 
and petitioned the king to take Arab Palestine under his control and protection.26 
Two months later, on December 1, 1948, a large gathering of West Bank notables, 
for the most part friendly to King Abdallah, was held in the West Bank town of Jericho. 
The conference issued a formal call for the uniting of the West Bank and Jordan. The 
Jordanian cabinet, in due course, approved this decision.27 By doing so, the Hashemites 
were successful in asserting primacy over Palestine, supported by an indigenous 
 
25 Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs. New York: Harper, 1957. 
26 Abdallah ibn Hussein, Memoirs of King Abdallah of Transjordan. London: Oxford University Press, 
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27 Day, East Bank West Bank. 
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Palestinian leadership. The Arab League had no choice but to honor the Palestinians’ 
decision and desire to merge with Jordan. When the winds of this situation finally died 
down, in April 1950 the Jordanians held elections on both East and West Banks to choose 
the deputies of the Jordanian lower house of the parliament representing both banks. 
The king appointed an upper house of twenty members, seven of whom were 
Palestinians. The new parliament met and endorsed the union. Jordan had irrevocably 
become a part of Palestinian politics.28  At this point, King Abdallah expanded his 
kingdom to include both East and West Banks of the Jordan River. The old East Bank 
was overcrowded by a new majority of Palestinians, many of them refugees. Prior to the 
annexation, Transjordan had a population of little more than 430,000. By 1950, this 
number was increased a factor of almost three times this number, thereby making the 
total population of Jordan, after the merger more than 1,280,000, almost two-thirds of 
whom were Palestinians.29 
After formation of the first government comprised of a cabinet made up of 
members from the two banks, King Abdullah openly tried to make a peace treaty with 
Israel, hoping he would solve two urgent issues at once. The first issue was an attempt to 
give Jordan an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, which the second armistice treaty had 
disregarded. The second issue was to address the refugee problem, either by allowing 
them to return to their towns (as Lydda and Ramleh refugees) or by having them 
absorbed and settled in a specified area. The king tried to conclude a comprehensive 
peace treaty with Israel, thereby intending to enhance the economic situation of a country 
crowded with refugees and cut off from its traditional trading partners in Egypt, Lebanon 
and Syria. The only remaining trade partners for the Jordanians were the two banks. The 
Jordanian government held that if the Israelis opened the borders for trade with the West 
Bank, the economic situation in the East Bank would flourish. 
 
28 Day, East Bank West Bank 
29 Avi Plascov, The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan 1948-1967. London: Cass, 1980. 
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The Jordanian attempts, made by King Abdullah’s government, to conclude a 
peace treaty with Israel were blocked by five obstacles.30   
1. Israel’s rejection of concessions on the return of refugees or an outlet to 
the Mediterranean.  
2. The public resentment, especially by the Palestinians, of any peace with 
the Israelis.  
3. Such resentment and outrage might destabilize the country at the early 
stages of state building and institutionalization.  
4. The Jordanian government, itself, which found itself under heavy 
pressure from local and Arab nationalists.  
5. The Arab masses’ mood of anger and bitterness over the defeat in the 
war that affected their dignity. They considered the unification a new 
attempt toward efforts for another unified war to retain the lands taken by 
force. The government slowed down progress toward a peace treaty, and it 
was finally aborted by the Israeli objection to the Jordanian proposals.  
It was apparent that after unification the demographic structure of the kingdom 
was changed in favor of the Palestinian majority. Most of these people were refugees 
whose mood posed a challenge, often characterized by frustration, despair, militancy and 
uncertainty. Thus, the prodigious challenge for the country was to establish security 
systems, both along the borders with Israel, to avoid any provocation for confrontation, 
and also internally, to neutralize and suppress any attempts to destabilize the order and 
rule of law. Some old West Bank institutions were to be dissolved and new ones created 
to be compatible with the unification requirements, thereby putting the country in modes 
of transition and integration. Thus, any forms of threats to its stability were unacceptable; 
on the contrary, they would likely be considered deliberate acts threatening national 
security. 
Another major challenge that Jordan had to confront after unification was how to 
lessen the differences between the two peoples (having two separate identities) so as to 
 
30 Robert Satlof, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994. 
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unite them under a single banner. The two peoples had different views of each other, 
needing time to accept each other in order to peacefully coexist in only one society. 
Palestinians saw Jordan as an occupying power, believing that Jordan, like many other 
Arab states, had failed them.31  In contrast, Jordanians viewed Palestinians as more 
sophisticated and modernized. They thought the Arab Legion had gone to Palestine to 
defend the Palestinians because they had refused to defend themselves.32 Many 
Palestinians, and the refugees in particular, fueled by the Arab leaders, blamed the king 
for their defeat to the Israelis. Accordingly, the refugees held the king responsible for 
their plight. However, some Palestinians viewed the king as the protector of their homes 
and towns in the West Bank. 
The Palestinian refugees fell into two broad categories. The first category 
included those who stayed in the West Bank, whether indigenous residents or people who 
fled their towns and areas taken over by Israel. The second category includes those who 
migrated to the East Bank, a category whose numbers increased over the years.  
 The refugees who came under Jordanian rule in 1948 were unhappy with their 
new circumstances. Many of them resisted absorption into Jordan in an effort to express 
their right to return to their homeland. Many did not even participate in the parliamentary 
elections held in Jordan in 1950. Moreover, they wanted to move Jordan toward allying 
with the Arab nationalist countries, which had opposed Jordan for many years. They were 
suspect of the Jordanian’s ties with the British, accusing Jordan of attempting to make a 
peace deal with Israel at the expense of Palestinians. Politically, also, these refugees were 
divided. While some Palestinians were boycotting elections, others were demanding an 
increase in their representation in the parliament to more accurately reflect that they were 
the majority population in the country, rather than dividing the seats between the two 
banks of the river on an equal basis.33   
King Abdallah had maintained good relations with some leading Palestinian 
families who did not hesitate to back him when he sought their support in the issue of 
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annexation of Palestine. Members from these families were rewarded with prominent 
positions in the Jordanian government. Later, king Hussein, the successor of King 
Abdallah, used this policy of co-optation of some Palestinian elites in order to attain their 
support and keep the balance in his governments. 
There were many dissident groups grown among the Palestinians, representing a 
formidable opposition to the king’s policies. Some political groups were focused on 
domestic grievances, while others both originated and were supported by forces outside 
Jordan. However, these groups were kept under the watchful eye of Jordanian security 
forces. The king was accused of being a traitor to the Arab cause for annexing the West 
Bank, as well as for shortly thereafter opening up secret negotiations with Israel in a lost 
effort to obtain access for Jordan to the Mediterranean at Haifa.34  The king was 
assassinated on June 21, 1951, while he was entering Al-Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem. 
He was accompanied, at the time, by his grandson, Hussein, who later became King of 
Jordan. 
Earlier attempts at selecting intermediaries to be involved in assisting the 
Palestinians to determine their own fate have mostly been subjected to manipulation by 
others. This weakness was caused by the Palestinians’ division over key issues, such as 
allowing no central authority to direct them, and the lack of unity and cohesion among 
Palestinian elites. Also, outside regional and global pressures have put many constraints 
on Palestinian representation. To a great extent, the issue of Palestinian representation has 
been closely harnessed to the exigencies of Arab politics, often exploited by the 
confederalists to advance their own interests. This exploitation was either collective, to 
undermine the Hashemites’ plans, or at the nationally individual level, where each 
country tried to further its own power and hegemony within the Arab arena.35 
By the time King Abdullah was assassinated, the process of the merger, 
integration and incorporation of the two banks, measured at different social, political and 
economic levels, was proceeding relatively smoothly. However, as Palestinians became 
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more politicized due to their education and civil administration experience, they began to 
oppose almost all government policies adopted by King Abdullah, whether at the 
domestic or the international level.  
The Jordanian government and its ruling elites managed the crisis resulting from 
the assassination of King Abdullah followed by the accession of Prince Talal to the 
throne as the legitimate heir of the Hashemite family. Prince Talal swore the oath as King 
of Jordan on September 6, 1951. Unlike King Abdullah’s patriarchal and dominating 
approach to governing, King Talal was more liberal in his policies, strongly embracing 
democratic principles. He even started initiating the process of reforms to suit 
contemporary developments in the country. King Talal’s policies and reforms were met 
by Palestinians’ satisfaction and appreciation. They were given more representation in the 
parliament. A new constitution was promulgated on January 2, 1952, upon which basic 
freedoms of speech, press and assembly were ensured. It also gave the parliament the 
authority to dismiss a cabinet by a two-thirds vote of no confidence. It made the 
government accountable to the parliament. King Talal had wanted to rule the country in 
the same way as constitutional monarchies do. He wanted to withdraw from internal 
politics, preferring to leave them to the Prime Minister and his cabinet. He abandoned the 
policies of King Abdullah that caused tension and provoked with other Arab countries, 
like the notion of Great Syria, and the attempt to make a peace deal with Israel. All such  
sound policies and reforms made it possible for the country to proceed in consolidating 
unification, only afterward addressing the other issues related to a more stable 
environment, such as economic, social and political issues.  
However, King Talal’s health problems that he had before becoming king 
prevented him from proceeding in his work. He handed over the monarchy rule to his 
son, Prince Hussein, who took over his constitutional powers on May 2, 1953, at the age 
of 17. 
The Prime Minister, Abul-Huda, who had worked with King Talal until, and after, 
King Hussein’s accession to the throne, seized the opportunity of King Talal’s liberal 
inclination, as well as his illness, to incite the opposition factions on both banks of the 
River of Jordan. These factions, as time passed, became more powerful and well-
28 
organized. These factions were represented in the parliament by two groups. The first 
group was the conservatives, who operated in the East Bank. The second group was the 
liberals, who operated in the West Bank. Both East and West Banks adopted nationalist 
and revolutionary approaches. The liberals in the West Bank opposed both the 
government and the king. They were exploited by external nationalist, progressive and 
revolutionary Arab regimes opposing the Hashemites’ policies. By contrast, the 
conservative opposition was loyal to the monarch, although it, too, often criticized both 
the government and the king. . 
Contrary to pan-Arab opinion, which stated that the Palestinian factor was the 
main motivator that led Jordan to shift toward democracy, the Hashemites were the 
pioneers of democracy in the Arab eastern region. King Talal started his 
democratizational reforms as soon as he took over power. He was highly praised by 
Western scholars and observers for his way of rule, which was similar to that of Western-
style constitutional monarchies. However, it was quite true that Palestinians were well-
educated, experienced in civil administration and more politicized due to both their 
contacts with the West and their long strife for the cause of statehood. Their voice among 
the Jordanian public’s opinion cannot be simply regarded as a majority who opposed the 
government’s policies and its ties with the British, and called for closer ties with pan-
Arab states such as Egypt and Syria. The Jordanian pan-Arabists, particularly the 
Palestinians, were also infatuated with the notions being expounded by President Nasser 
who, after the Tripartite aggression in Egypt in 1956, they considered to be a national 
hero who could liberate Palestine. Accordingly, they thought they had found an 
alternative to the Hashemites, whom they perceived to be adopting pro-British and anti-
nationalism stands. However, the anti-Hashemite opposition groups were fostered by 
Nasser’s propaganda, which was launched to destabilize the country, and bring the 
Hashemites back within the pan-Arab sphere. King Hussein, rather than exploiting 
narrow state nationalism to accomplish his goals, had based his strategies on the principle 
of the Great Arab Revolt that called for Arab unity. 
As the period from 1959 to 1963 witnessed many changes in the Arab world to 
include military coups, assassinations of ruling families, as in Iraq, and alliance-making, 
King Hussein fostered a Jordanian identity to unite the country. However, the pro-
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Nasserist Palestinians opposed this new Hashemite policy and considered it a step toward 
preventing the restoration of Palestine. The Palestinians thought that the call for a 
Jordanian entity would dilute the Palestinian one that Nasser and pan-Arab nationalists 
kept calling for, which they thought would weaken the struggle to liberate Palestine. The 
Palestinians became annoyed, and the government immediately moved to assure the 
Palestinians of its concern about the Palestinian issue. This concern was well-articulated 
by the Jordanian Prime Minister, Wasfi Al-Tal, in his white paper, presented to the 
parliament in 1962: 
Our primary objective of national mobilization both in the military and the 
civil sectors…is to implement the plan which we view as the most 
appropriate for restoration of Palestine. For the Palestinian cause to us, is 
an issue of life or death. The government will present to your August 
Council the ‘Palestine Plan’ which aims at shifting our country to the 
center of power, effectiveness, and mobilization of Arab efforts…in one 
front that will bring about victory for our cause.36 
The division in the Arab world reached its climax in 1963 when, in Cairo, the 
leaders of Egypt, Iraq and Syria concluded a federal agreement that did not work. Jordan 
would have been isolated if it worked, since this agreement would put Jordan face-to-face 
with the revolutionary forces. However, Syria and Iraq started talks in July 1963 to form 
a union, without including Egypt. The unity between these two Baathist regimes would 
pose a threat that might destabilize Jordan, since the Palestinian intellectuals were mostly 
Baathists and nationalists. Furthermore, the Iraqi-Syrian unity narrowed the gap between 
Jordan and Egypt, a step that Jordan benefited from by neutralizing the pro-Nasserist 
factions internally, as well as by opening the door toward Egyptian-Jordanian 
rapprochement. 
C. JORDAN’S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH EGYPT 
Both Jordan and Egypt saw in the potential Iraqi-Syrian unity a threat to each of 
them, though from different perspectives. Nasser’s image and prestige might be 
undermined, and Jordanian security concerns would increase. Jordan and Egypt at this 
stage shared one common interest in avoiding a confrontation with Israel that the pan-
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Arab nationalists favored. Because both countries realized that they could effectively do 
nothing to restore the Palestinian rights, at a time when Israeli military superiority 
prevailed, the issue served as a catalyst for warming up Egyptian-Jordanian relations in 
the mid-1960s. 
Furthermore, the Israeli plans to divert the Jordan River water resources (in 
addition to the Syrian counterplan to control Jordan water resources in the Syrian 
territories) forced both Jordan and Egypt to work closely together to address such 
developments. Due to Israel’s overwhelming military supremacy, Nasser became 
convinced of the need to change the current Arab policy. The new policy would be 
centered on Arab joint action, and refrain from escalating tensions with Israel. All actions 
and steps toward Israel should be carefully calculated and estimated. Consequently, 
President Nasser called for an Arab Summit to be held in Cairo to discuss the general 
Arab situation, as well as the current Israeli plans for diversion of the Jordan River’s 
water. In January 1964, kings and presidents of the Arab states gathered in Cairo for the 
first Arab Summit Conference. The Arab “Cold War,” thus, was suspended, and 
apparently cordial relations were re-established within the space of a few hours.37 
The Arab Summit provided a unique opportunity for King Hussein to exploit his 
newly-improved relations with President Nasser. Even before the Summit, the king paid 
many visits to Cairo, where he demonstrated respect to revolutionary regimes, as well as 
recognition of the Yemen Republic (which had gained Nasser’s adulation). Moreover, 
King Hussein highly valued the role that Egypt could play in leading the inter-Arab 
relations. Eventually, the king did not object to the Cairo Summit’s, which had been 
orchestrated under the chairmanship of Nasser, decisions to create the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) and to arm the Palestinian Liberation Army, despite the 
security threats that might arise in the West Bank. King Hussein also accepted the 
establishment of the Unified Arab Military Command under an Egyptian general. The 
Summit  opened  the door for the Palestinians to have a representative at the Arab League  
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to keep in contact with the member states in the Arab League and with the Palestinians. 
Its goal was to coordinate among fellow Arabs the means and different methods towards 
the liberation of Palestine. 
The Jordanian-Egyptian warm relations and rapprochement soon ended, in 1965, 
after King Hussein cracked down on the PLO, closing down its offices in Jordan. Another 
reason for the break in relations was the pressure put on Cairo by the left-oriented 
Baathist regime in Damascus.38  However, while the peace lasted, it also served to 
achieve two closely-related objectives: the prevention of an all-out Arab-Israeli war, and 
the conciliation of the King’s Palestinian subjects, many of whom had now languished 
for the better part of a generation as homeless refugees.39 
Hussein’s adoption of a new strategy toward the alignment with the Arabs in 
1964-1965, even at the expense of Jordan’s security and stability, spotlighted his quest to 
gain the acceptance of his rule among the Arab nationalists, particularly the radicals. 
Such a quest would further enhance his domestic legitimacy. By doing so, and unlike his 
father, who had different regional ambitions and a different vision of pan-Arabism, 
Hussein’s main focus turned toward the maintenance of Jordan sovereignty through 
ensuring his regime’s security. Such a notion led later to the Jordanization of the country 
under different domestic, regional, and international circumstances. 
D. THE FIRST ARAB SUMMIT OPENS THE ROAD TO THE EMERGENCE 
OF NATIONAL PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP 
Previously, on September 22, 1948, the Arab League tried to establish an all-
Palestinian government to be operated from Gaza (under pressure from Egypt). The 
Mufti was elected President, and Ahmad Hilmi, a Palestinian political figure, was 
appointed Prime Minister by the Palestinian National Congress. The objective behind the 
establishment of this government was to undermine the Emir Abdallah’s attempts to 
annex the West Bank to his dynasty, as the news leaked of his maneuvers with the British 
and loyal Palestinian friends to accommodate his desire. The Emir believed that the 
annexation of the West Bank would be a viable solution to the economic difficulties 
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confronting both West and East Banks. Furthermore, he fought the 1948 war, thereby 
saving the West Bank from Israeli expansion, intending to annex the West Bank to his 
rule. The Emir moved rapidly to counter the establishment of a Palestinian government 
headed by his opponent, Al-Mufti. He also gained the unanimity of the Palestinian 
people, through conferences held both in Amman and Jericho in October and December 
1948, respectively, to unite the West Bank with the East Bank. 
The declaration of establishing a Palestinian government in Gaza on October 1, 
1948, though destined to die at birth, along with the existence of a Palestinian Congress 
at that time, refused to fade away. It remained active toward keeping the Palestinian 
cause, in coordination with the Arab states, as the central issue for all Arabs and 
Muslims. However, the Palestinians have suffered throughout history from a lack of a 
national body to represent them. At this time, the Palestinian elites were divided by their 
difference of ideology, as well as by political tides, such as communism, Baathism, 
nationalism, progressivism, and various Muslim movements. Some, however, were loyal 
to certain regimes, like the Nasserists and the Hashemites. The absence of a unified 
leadership kept their entity in a situation of flux between different allegiances. 
The first step taken to strengthen the Palestinian entity was taken in December 
1945, when the Arab League Council adopted a resolution in which it decided that 
Palestinians may be represented by one or more representatives to participate in all the 
proceedings of the council in accordance with that provided for by Charter of the Arab 
League, though such representation was not to exceed three.40  The second step was 
taken when the same council decided to set up a Palestinian committee, given the name 
al-Ha’ia al-Arabiya al-Ulia (The High Arab Committee – HAC), to represent the 
Palestinians in the Arab League. At this time, in 1963, the Arab League appointed 
Ahmad Al-Shuqairi as the Palestinian representative to the Arab League, succeeding 
Ahmad Hilmipasha, the old representative who had passed away three months 
previously.41  Nasser’s lobbying, along with pressure being exerted by the Arab League, 
was behind this appointment--Al-Shuqairi was known for his anti-Hashemite policies, 
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especially the unity of the West Bank with the East Bank of Jordan. By doing so, Nasser 
continued the Egyptian attempts to revive and fuel the concept of the Palestinian entity 
which would become independent from the Hashemites’ containment and domination. 
Al-Shuqairi, a lawyer and politician, had experienced international affairs through 
his work as a Saudi representative to the United Nations. He became more 
knowledgeable in diplomatic affairs. His main concerns were the independence of 
Palestinian decision-making and the formulation of a Palestinian entity. He tried to 
establish a Palestinian government that would operate independently of the Hashemites 
and the Arab League, as well as working to establish a Palestinian National Congress. 
The Jordanian government rejected his plans and informed the Arabs through its 
consistent stand that Palestinians would be free to decide their destiny and future after the 
liberation of Palestine. The Jordanian-Egyptian mutual conflict over the Palestinian entity 
made Egypt more energetic toward working to establish a Palestinian representative 
organization. Eventually, the first National Palestinian Congress convened in Jerusalem 
in May 1964, announcing the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO). This step was blessed by the second Arab Summit held in Alexandria, Egypt, in 
September 1964. Now the Palestinian entity could begin, though it needed time to 
mature, depending upon the new leadership’s (i.e., PLO) relation with the Arabs to make 
their issue the center of the Arab political struggle. 
The new entity needed to mobilize the Palestinian people around their national 
cause, currently dispersed in different areas of the region. After the 1948 war, a large 
number of Palestinians migrated to Jordan and became Jordanian citizens. Even though 
most West Bankers remained in the West Bank, a number of Palestinians remained in 
their villages under Jewish occupation, and the people of Gaza under Egyptian rule 
stayed there without a state while some went to Syria and Lebanon. Now Palestinians, 
after the establishment of the PLO, had two competing representatives: the Jordanian 
government and the PLO. 
E. COMPETING REPRESENTATIVES: THE PLO AND JORDAN 
Jordan wanted to represent the Palestinians, the Jordanian regime rejecting any 
Palestinian body’s attempts to represent Palestinians. For example, Jordan rejected the 
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General Palestine Government, set up in Gaza in 1948 through Egyptian manipulation, 
and the Higher Palestine Organization, based in Cairo and Damascus, which was presided 
over by Haj Amin Al-Husayni. However, Jordan did not object to the Arab decision 
regarding the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1964, since the 
PLO did not claim to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and made no 
claims of sovereignty over the West Bank. Therefore, the apparent position of the PLO, 
at the time, did not oppose the Jordanian claims on both.42  Moreover, the PLO’s 
Palestinian National Charter mentioned that “this organization does not exercise any 
regional sovereignty over the West Bank in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or the 
Gaza Strip or the Himma area.”43  The PLO head at the time, Ahmad Al-Shuqairi 
declared, at a press conference in Cairo, that the new organization would cooperate with 
the Jordanian government, and that this cooperation would have “a special charter 
because the majority of the Palestinian people live in Jordan.”44 
Responding to these commitments, in his letter of designation of the new Prime 
Minister, Wasfi Al-Tall, on February 13, 1965, King Hussein wrote that one main task of 
the new government toward the Palestinian cause would be: 
…rendering support to the Palestine Liberation Organization at national 
and international levels. This position is based on our faith that as long as 
our brothers, Palestine’s children, in Jordan and outside, choose the 
organization as a way to mobilize and organize efforts of the Palestinian 
people, we shall stand by the organization, support it and back up its effort 
until Palestinian people and Arab nations reinstate Arab rights in 
Palestine.45 
He also stressed that the new PLO must not harm the unity of the Jordanian 
nation. 
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King Hussein appointed Wasfi Al-Tal as Prime Minister, for several reasons. First 
and most importantly, were his accumulated experiences of the Palestinian issue acquired 
through both his drafting of the Al-Tal White Paper, and his dealings with the 
Palestinians gained from his involvement in the Arab Rescue Army in 1948. Second, Al-
Tal was a solid and loyal Jordanian patriot who had run the Jordanian information and 
publicity system during the prime ministry of Hazza’ al-Majali in 1959. He, along with 
al-Majali, had adopted the defensive Jordanian strategy at that time. Third, the king 
thought that after the death of al-Majali, Al-Tal was the right person to stand in the face 
of Nasser and could mobilize all Jordanians behind him in defending the Jordanian 
identity and independence as part of Jordanian nationalism. 
Al-Tal chose a Palestinian intellectual, Hazem Nusseibeh, to run the ministry of 
foreign affairs. He was also the co-drafter of the Al-Tal White Paper. This period 
coincided with the Jordanian-PLO conflict in relations, necessitating that a Jordanian 
minister of Palestinian origin act diplomatically in his dealings with Arabs and foreign 
diplomats.  Realizing  the  demographic  structure  of  Jordan,  with  its  large  number  of  
Palestinians, Al-Shuqairi, in 1965, tried to make Jordan his staging base, from which he 
and his staff and the PLA could operate. He did not intend to make the West Bank his 
headquarters of operations, fearing Israeli attacks. 
Two weeks after the appointment of Al-Tal, Al-Shuqairi visited Amman from 
Cairo, demanding the formation of a military force under PLO control, the deduction of 
five percent of the wages of Palestinian employees as taxes for the PLO, compulsory 
military service, and fortification of frontier villages. The Jordanian government rejected 
all of these demands as being undue encroachments on Jordanian sovereignty and internal 
affairs.  
In a press conference in Amman, attempting to reflect Palestinian feelings toward 
the Jordanian position on the establishment of the PLO and its pledge for support 
(declared by the king’s letter of designation of Al-Tal to the Cabinet), , Al-Shuqairi 
declared  his  choice  of  Transjordanians,  like  Najib Rushaydat,  for  membership  in the  
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PLO’s Executive Committee. He also declared that Jordan was the home of the PLO, that 
the East Bank was torn from Palestine in 1919, and that the East Bank was fundamentally 
one with the motherland.46 
It is useful to contrast the nature of Palestinian leadership with that of Jordan, 
both before and after the establishment of the PLO. The leadership figures in the West 
Bank before 1964 were considered community leaders who served as intermediaries 
between the people and the central government in managing community affairs. The 
political opposition leaders did not rise to the level of national leaders, since they neither 
represented, nor claimed to represent Palestinians. Palestinians had realized that they 
were citizens of a kingdom whose king, in most cases, was considered the only national 
leader. Moreover, West Bank leaders and people became more convinced, after many 
years of unification with the East Bank, that separation from Jordan would not protect 
them from Israeli expansionism. It would also not help them establish a viable and 
independent entity, politically or economically, since there was no solution to their 
issues. By the time the PLO was established, the Palestinians in the West Bank had 
become fully assimilated and integrated within the Jordanian entity.  
The new Palestinian leadership, represented by the PLO, and empowered by the 
Arab Summit resolution, began to deal with Jordan, as an independent organization 
representing the Palestinian people. The PLO Charter stated that its main goal was 
centered on strengthening the Palestinian entity by building up the popular Palestinian 
base. The PLO started to place demands on Jordan which Jordan could not tolerate. The 
deterioration in relations between Jordan and the PLO started a short time after the PLO 
demands and declarations, especially the demands that Jordan institute a compulsory 
military service. King Hussein responded in an aired speech by saying: 
We shall not discriminate between the eastern Jordanian and the western 
Jordanian, and no one will be able to tear this unity asunder and take the 
brother away from his brother, and take the soldier away from his unit, 
and much of what we have recently heard and continue to hear…is only 
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meant to break apart the one structure, and to tear apart the one entity, 
which we shall not allow under any circumstances.47 
King Hussein wrote a letter to President Nasser in which the king accused the 
PLO leader, Ahmad Al-Shuqairi, of trying to tear the bonds of the Palestinians’ and 
Jordanians’ brotherhood in the west and east of the River Jordan. In addition to his 
attempts to stir up hidden rancor and discord, he tried to break up the unity of the people 
and army. On his visit to the city of Ajlun in northern Jordan in 1966, at the moment the 
Arab armies entered Palestine, King Hussein declared that the Palestinian issue ceased to 
have a Palestinian character. He also said that the people of Jordan, both Jordanians and 
Palestinians, had a strong belief that the unity of both banks was blessed by God, that it 
was backed up by the people, and that it was considered the nucleus of the larger Arab 
unity. He also threatened to cut off every hand that harmed the unity or the country, and 
that Jordan would not tolerate any further provocations.48 
Through this warning, the king, not only meant to convey a message to Al-
Shuqairi, but also to the Fatah movement, headed by Yasser Arafat. During the period 
from 1965 to 1967, the Palestinian liberation movement, Fatah, was operating inside 
Jordanian territory and carried out a number of attacks on Israel from within Jordanian 
borders. In retaliation for these attacks, Israel attacked the villages on the border between 
the two countries. The Jordanian government tried to prevent such provocative attacks by 
Fatah through the use of force. The situation escalated the tension between Jordan and the 
PLO, especially after an Israeli attack on the West Bank village of Summou on 
November 13, 1966, which was followed by a massive Palestinian demonstration in the 
West Bank against Jordan for its ineptitude in protecting the people. 
In addition to his old demands on Jordan, Al-Shuqairi brought new ones – he said 
he wanted Jordan to deal with the PLO officials and the Executive Committee members 
as diplomats, having diplomatic immunity. Furthermore, he suggested that Jordanian 
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radio be used to broadcast Palestinian nationalist programs. Jordan, as before, rejected his 
demands, upon which he began his propaganda campaign against Jordan and King 
Hussein. The Jordanian government began taking the necessary measures to prevent the 
penetration of the PLO into Jordanian society. 
By 1965, inter-Arab relations had entered a new state of tension when the two 
allies of the United States, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran, called for an Islamic 
conference. The Saudi monarch, King Faisal, visited Jordan to get its support by joining 
the conference, Jordan giving its approval. Egypt, a Soviet Union ally, accused these 
countries of implementing the United States policy of resisting communism. A military 
coup took place in Syria, also at this time (i.e., in February 1966), where a more militant 
Baathist regime took power. This regime supported the Fatah, since both shared almost 
the same ideology, calling for a popular liberation war. 
Syria allowed Fatah factions to infiltrate Jordanian territories to attack Israel. The 
Jordanian regime believed that the main reason for this was to create a state of instability 
on the Jordanian-Israeli front, thereby embarrassing the Jordanian government in front of 
its own population. This was especially true, since Israel usually responded to such 
provocative attacks by striking the border villages, triggering adverse public reactions in 
the West Bank. 
All of these developments contributed to the division of the Arabs into two 
camps. The first was the revolutionary camp, which included Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, 
Algeria and the PLO. The second camp was the conservative states, which included 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Morocco. The PLO alignment with the revolutionary 
camp gave it more strength and momentum to oppose Jordan.49  Al-Shuqairi’s policies 
against Jordan included his support of Jordanian political opposition activists. On many 
occasions, He called on the government to release the arrested activists and grant amnesty 
to those outside the country. Due to PLO manipulation, the Jordanian representation in 
the Palestine National Congress (NPC) was reduced, losing its majority by the time the 
third NPC was held in May, 1966. 
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At this stage, the PLO began to pose itself as a representative of the Palestinian 
people and recognized by Arab states. The king delivered a speech on June 14, 1966, 
where he addressed all issues pertaining to Palestine, the PLO, and national security red 
lines. The king accused the revolutionary camp of being puppets in the hands of the 
communists. The Jordanian government made the decision on July 14, 1966 to stop 
cooperation with the PLO that did not reflect its own character. However, Fatah 
continued to look for a way to use Jordan as a safe haven and base of operations, since 
many Palestinians lived there, and also because of its long border with Israel from which 
it could use many avenues of infiltration. 
Inter-Arab relations and division over many issues prior to the war in 1967 show 
that the Arab situation was not solid. Each country had its concerns and worries. They 
were not ready to win a war against the militarily superior Israel. Whereas Nasser and 
King Hussein both tried their best to avoid a military confrontation with Israel, the 
Palestinian Fatah and the Baathist regime in Syria pursued the slogan of liberation of 
Palestine at any cost. The prevailing Arab situation in the period that preceded the 1967 
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III. A NEW UNEXPECTED ERA OF CHANGE: 1967 
Jordan’s relations with Egypt, Syria and the PLO during the years 1966-1967 
were characterized by tension and differences in views, policies, and alliances. However, 
Jordan was forced in the 1950s and 1960s to conform, at least in public, to the pan-Arab 
consensus. This was the era coinciding with the domination of Arab politics by the 
charismatic figure of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and with the youthful and untested leadership 
of King Hussein. For some years, however, the main concern for Arab nationalism or 
Nasserism was to confront Western imperialism by inciting both political and social 
revolution to overthrow traditional conservative Arab regimes. The Arab nationalist 
activists and leaders believed that Arab unity would be attained, and Palestine restored, 
only after abolishing these regimes. 
King Hussein adopted a survival strategy through a combination of concessions to 
Arabs’ demands and conformity. This was coupled with steps taken to persuade the Arab 
nationalists adopt his policies, and leaning toward the West. Consequently, he abandoned 
the idea of joining the Baghdad Pact, accepted Arab financial support to compensate for 
the loss of British financing, dismissed the British commanding officers from the Arab 
Legion and “Arabized” the Arab Legion’s command. Even though he took such steps to 
satisfy the Arab nationalists’ desires, he was subjected to a military coup by a pro-Nasser 
military officers’ movement, resulting in his dismissal of the radical Arab nationalist 
prime minister, Sulayman Nabulsi.50 
It is true that the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization by the 
first Arab Summit in 1964 was considered a blow to Jordan’s sovereignty over Palestine 
over the long term. However, it did not challenge Jordan immediately, since Nasser, who 
had no intention of confronting Israel, controlled it. Nevertheless, regardless of Nasser’s 
support of the PLO, the king did not hesitate to defy the PLO and close down its offices 
when they differed over the representation of Palestinians in Jordan.51 
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The general Arab situation prior to the 1967 war was characterized by escalating 
rivalry, tension and mistrust. Egypt and the Ba’ath regime in Syria were at odds. Jordan 
and the PLO were competing over Palestinian representation. The Iraqis fell close to the 
Egyptians. The Saudis were against Egypt over the Yemen issue. On the other side of the 
equation, Israel initiated a number of provocations on the Syrian and Jordanian borders. It 
also tried to divert the water of the River Jordan, after its air strike on a water-diversion 
construction site in Syrian territory on July 6, 1966. The deterioration in the situation 
between the Arabs and the Israelis in 1966 moved Egypt closer to Syria against Israel, 
although it had no intentions of attacking Israel.  
In 1967, the Arabs reached a consensus to confront Israel militarily, with the 
expectation that a short, inconclusive war would benefit the Arabs politically, even if 
they lost on the battlefield. King Hussein felt he could not stay on the sidelines alone. The 
Israeli border raids on the West Bank aroused public opinion domestically, which made it 
impossible for the king to remain uncommitted to the Arab consensus. Consequently, the 
king made the decision to join the Arab consensus, placing his army under Egyptian 
command, in accordance with the Egyptian-Jordanian pact signed a matter of days before 
the war started.  
Another Arab pact was signed on June 4, 1967 between Egypt and Iraq. However, 
the Arab defense pacts were quick and immature, taking place at the last minute, in an 
attempt at a quick reconciliation of the deep political differences prevailing among Arabs 
before the war. 
Jordan joined the Arab consensus to stand in the face of Israel’s military, and 
Jordanian forces entered the 1967 war under the command of an Egyptian commander, 
General Abdel Munim Riyadh, commander of the Arab Eastern Front. President Nasser 
applauded the king on the courageous step by saying, “When history is written, your 
courage and bravery will be cited, and so will be the courage of the Jordanian people who 
joined this battle without hesitation.”52 
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The 1967 war culminated in the abrupt defeat of Arab forces and the loss of Arab 
lands. Jordan lost all the West Bank territories it had obtained in 1948. Syria’s defeat and 
loss of the strategic Golan Heights discredited the Ba’ath regime, contributing to its 
overthrow in 1970 by another Ba’athist, Hafez al-Assad. After losing Sinai and the war, 
Nasser lost his prestige among the Arab public, and his role was never the same again. 
The role of the Arab oil-rich countries in the Arabian Peninsula became more influential 
in supporting the front-line states’ weak economies and their reformation projects.  
After the 1967 war, Jordan faced many challenges emerging from the economic 
and political crisis caused by the loss of the West Bank and Jerusalem. The defeat of the 
Arab armies in the 1967 war shocked and frustrated Palestinians, who had thought for a 
long time that their land would be restored by their Arab brethren. The Jordanian 
bargaining and justifications over the Palestinian issue was weakened because of the loss 
of the West Bank and its people.53 
The greatest and unexpected result of the war was that Arabs’ attitudes toward 
Israel changed, namely that Israel was to be viewed as an existing reality to live and deal 
with, rather than as an alien body to be rejected.54  Large numbers of Palestinians became 
refugees and displaced people who migrated to the neighboring Arab countries. Jordan, 
once again, received the largest portion of them, which increased the number of 
Palestinians in Jordan to become a majority. Palestinians were forced to live under worse 
conditions in a country whose economy was shattered and unable to accommodate the 
unexpected waves of refugees.  
After the 1967 war, the Arab leaders, especially King Hussein and Nasser, tried to 
find excuses for their defeat. Nasser, in a telephone call to King Hussein, accused the 
USA and Britain of providing support to Israel, the king supporting this statement. The 
people in the Arab streets also believed that such accusations were true. Although Nasser 
tried to resign, the people wanted him to remain. 
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There were two main factors that contributed to the survival of the Jordanian 
kingdom during this period of defeat. The first was the Jordanian commitment to the 
Arab consensus to confront Israel.. .The second was the king’s warning to the Arabs not 
to let their strong emotions cloud their perception of Israel’s power. 
Gradually the people absorbed the shock of defeat, at the same time vowing to 
take revenge on Israel. Jordanian-Palestinian relations reached a high level of tension due 
to the Palestinians’ accusations that the Jordanian army had not fought hard enough in the 
war, and that Jordan had conspired with Israel to defeat Nasser. Nevertheless, Jordan 
continued to represent the Palestinians who, at the same time, moved to the East Bank 
after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, believing that it was also part of their 
country. However, they continued to be dealt with there as refugees or displaced 
people.55 
A. JORDAN’S PRIORITIES AFTER THE 1967 WAR 
The 1967 war resulted in acute economic difficulties, since the occupation of the 
West Bank led to the loss of almost 38 percent of Jordan’s GDP.56  Although the GDP 
had previously been expressed mostly in “hard” currency (e.g., through tourism revenues 
from Jerusalem and Bethlehem, as well as the exchange of trade and businesses between 
the two banks of the Jordan River), this expression was halted after the war. At the 
domestic level, Jordan’s main concern was the recovery of its economic situation and the 
rebuilding of its armed forces that were destroyed during the war. King Hussein sought 
support from the Gulf states, which contributed a total of $60 million following the 
king’s speech on June 7, 1967 in which he urged the Arab brethren to support the 
Jordanian forces with material or moral assistance.57  Also, the large numbers of refugees 
and displaced people moving to Jordan constituted a heavy economic burden on a 
country of limited resources. Jordan was forced to deal with this situation until further 
outside support was secured. 
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Jordan thought that the occupation would not last long, so its policies were 
centered on the unity of the two banks. Thus, it kept the bridges between the two banks of 
the Jordan River open. Also, the refugees and the displaced thought their stay in Jordan 
was temporary and that they would return home soon. The PLO leaders were looking for 
the separation of the West Bank from Jordan, once liberated. In contrast, the Jordanian 
government’s position toward the West Bank was incongruent with that of the PLO’s 
position, which affirmed that the destiny of Palestine should be determined by the 
Palestinian people. The king moved outside Jordan to seek Western countries’ support to 
restore the West Bank, especially the United States, whose role would be very effective if 
a resolution to the conflict was ever to be adopted. He met with President Johnson in late 
June, after addressing the UN, where the king offered peace to Israel if it would withdraw 
from the West Bank. However, President Johnson left this option open for direct 
negotiation with Israel, an option that Jordan was dissatisfied with.58 
The PLO-Jordanian conflict over Palestinian representation appeared again three 
months after the 1967 war, during the Al-Khartoum Arab Summit on August 29, 1967. 
Al-Shuqairi, the PLO leader, thinking that the Israeli occupation would not last long, 
requested that Palestine be given the right of self-determination, and not to return to 
Jordanian rule. He continued to claim that the PLO was the sole, legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people.59  However, the PLO failed to secure Arab approval on this 
issue. The king instead, took a moderate move toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, realizing 
(through his state visits to Western countries) that Israel existence was a reality that had 
to be accepted. He was rational in his approach, trying to convince the Arab leaders 
during the Al-Khartoum summit to exert all efforts, including diplomatic ones, in an 
endeavor to secure the restoration the West Bank Arab lands.60  The king obtained 
Nasser’s support of his approach when Nasser declared at the summit that, “the only open 
avenue” before them was the political one. In this context, it was necessary that King 
Hussein deal with the Americans in order to regain the West Bank, since the United 
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States was the only country that could exert enough pressure on Israel to cause them to 
abandon the West Bank. The Arab Summit at Khartoum, on September 1, 1967, gave the 
king the freedom, with Nasser’s support, to seek a diplomatic solution to this issue, which 
also reinstated Jordan as the sole representative of Palestinians, against the PLO claim.61 
The king, through his state visits to Moscow and Western countries, developed an 
approach that acknowledged the reality of Israel’s existence in the region, in line with the 
international community and world public opinion. This created a division in the Arab 
world between those who adopted this moderate approach and those of the opponents and 
more hard-line countries, including the PLO. This polarization was reflected in UN 
Security Council Resolution 242, which was accepted by both Jordan and Egypt, but 
rejected by Syria and the Palestinians (because it was vague and dealt with Palestinians 
only as refugees). However, Resolution 242 became a sort of “bible” for the Middle East 
political process. Other Arab countries realized how viable this resolution was to in 
helping them achieve most of their desired rights, urging both Syria and the Palestinians 
to change their attitudes toward it and accept it as the best available international formula 
for solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The UN Secretary designated Gunnar Jarring as his 
special envoy to work with the concerned states toward reaching a peaceful settlement to 
this issue. Jarring’s efforts were hindered by both the Palestinian fedayeen movement and 
direct opposition. 
B. JORDAN’S CIVIL WAR: 1970-71 
As the fedayeen and Palestinian guerrilla bases spread out along the eastern bank 
of the Jordan River immediately after the Six-Day War in 1967, the fedayeen infiltration 
and attacks against Israel invited Israeli reprisals and retaliations on villages and 
populated areas, Israel failing to distinguish between fedayeen and civilians. Many 
peasants and farmers in the Jordan Valley deserted their farmlands and villages to seek 
shelter and safe haven from such attacks, which aroused the government’s and people’s 
outrage against both Israel and the Palestinian guerrillas.  
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The people raised concerns about their security and means of earning a living, 
since they came under repeated Israeli attacks. The Jordanian government tried to prevent 
the fedayeen from acting on their own. The Jordanian government decided to maintain 
the security of Jordan and to impose the rule of law.62  However, the fedayeen infiltration 
into the West Bank to attack Israel continued. The Israelis decided to put an end to such 
attacks by uprooting the fedayeen bases in the Jordan Valley. In March 1968, Jordanian 
Army intelligence gathered information about an imminent Israeli attack on the East 
Bank. Jordanian intelligence warned the fedayeen to evacuate their bases. 
On March 21, 1968, Israeli forces waged an attack on the Al-Karameh sector in 
the Jordan Valley. The Jordanian Army engaged the Israeli attacking force, using all arms 
available in a fierce 15-hour battle. The battle ended with the defeat and withdrawal of 
the Israeli forces, leaving behind many losses and a number of serviceable tanks and 
armored vehicles that were then displayed in the Jordanian Capital Square.  
The fedayeen bases in Al-Karameh were destroyed by the Israeli air and ground 
forces attacks. Nevertheless, the fedayeen, encouraged by the Jordanian Army 
infantrymen, fought well, as the Jordanian artillery and armor provided support. Had the 
Jordanian Army not engaged the Israelis by use of its armor, anti-armor and artillery, the 
fedayeen, with their small arms and machine guns, would have been easily defeated by 
the attackers. 
Al-Kamareh was the first Arab battle fought with Israel since the Six-Day War in 
1967. The battle restored Arab dignity on one hand, and raised and maintained both the 
morale and self-confidence of the Jordanian Army and the fedayeen. Al-Karameh Day 
has become a national day where Jordanians commemorate the heroism and sacrifices of 
the Jordanian Army in combating and defeating the Israeli Army. However, the PLO 
tried to record the victory in Al-Karameh as being due to its own contribution. The PLO, 
backed by Palestinians and other Arab nationalist states, was able to publicize and 
magnify its role in the Al-Karameh battle. Accordingly, the PLO gained more 
recognition, credibility and publicity. Thus, immediately after the physical battle, the 
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Jordanian government and the PLO were involved in psychological warfare and a 
propaganda battle over who actually defeated the Israelis. 
At this time, Al-Fatah’s leadership decided that it was necessary to emerge from 
underground and present itself to the world. On April 16, 1968, in Damascus, Yassir 
Arafat was chosen its official spokesman and its representative for all official questions 
of organizations, finance and information.63  The Al-Fatah’s leadership was able to 
secure financial support from Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and other Gulf states where 
Palestinians worked and earned money. Arafat and his group were able to evict Al-
Shuqair from PLO leadership through the approval of the Palestine National Congress 
held in Cairo in July 1968.64  
On November 4, 1968, due to guerrilla provocation, kidnapping and harassment 
of civilian and military people, the Jordanian Army exchanged fire with the guerrillas and 
shelled their bases in the refugee camps of Wahdat, Jebel Hussein and Schneller, which 
led the guerrillas to fight back.65  Arafat disclosed to one of his aides: “We had no choice 
but to reach a modus vivendi. We had to protect ourselves in order to survive as a 
movement.”66 
In 1969, Arafat’s group was able to take control of the main official PLO 
apparatus and establish a sort of joint PLO-Fatah military command, which in one form 
or another survived a number of trials, including the Jordanian Civil War in September 
1970.  
As Al-Fatah spread out in Jordan, mainly among Palestinian camps and urban 
communities, it started establishing an infrastructure of clinics, orphanages, schools and 
training centers in the refugee camps. It reflected a state within a state, that alarming 
King Hussein. The guerrilla authority existed in parallel with the royal power, thus 
starting a conflict over power and control of the country, focused mainly on the capital 
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and main cities of Jordan. There were many cases of "shakedowns,” where merchants and 
ordinary citizens were forced to give money, both to real and fake commandos.67  Many 
unarmed soldiers were kidnapped and tortured on their way to either their units or homes 
during leave.  
The situation in Jordan became intolerable due to undisciplined guerrilla actions 
and negative attitudes toward the Jordanian citizens and army.68  Paradoxically, the Al-
Fatah crisis with Jordan coincided with the time that it reached its highest effectiveness 
against Israel. It had conducted many successful attacks in 1969 and early 1970 against 
Israel, including attacks on Israel to sabotage its oil installations, and other sites of 
economic significance. 
Arafat had to resist the political challenge to the guerrilla movement represented 
by the Rogers peace plan, warning Arab leaders not to accept it. However, Egypt, being 
exposed to Israeli attacks since July 1969, accepted the plan, making a public statement 
on June 24, 1970 that it would be the basis for a Middle East solution based on the UN 
Security Council resolution of November 1967. 
In early 1970, the Palestinian fedayeen were enjoying the climax of a wave of 
popularity throughout the Arab world. Arafat kept moving between their bases in Jordan 
and Arab capitals. He used diplomacy to solve a number of delicate crises and 
confrontations between the fedayeen and the Arab states, but could not do so in the crises 
in Jordan. The reason was that the Jordanian government had lost trust and confidence in 
him and his factions, deciding that Jordan could survive without guerrillas. 
In January 1970, sporadic clashes between King Hussein’s forces and the 
fedayeen resulted in over a hundred casualties on both sides. The radical PLO parties 
hijacked Western airliners and took Western hostages in Jordan, believing that these 
presented a great challenge to Jordanian sovereignty. As the Rogers peace plan became 
the top news of most Arab media and diplomatic salons, Arafat was pulled by his factions  
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into new battles with the Jordanian Army in Amman and Zarqa from June 6 through 12, 
1970. The guerrillas held 90 foreigners in Amman’s two largest hotels, freed safely by 
the king’s diplomacy and concessions.69 
The climax of the civil war took place in September 1970, when the Jordanian 
Army waged a full-scale attack on the guerrilla bases in the cities using artillery, tank and 
any available weapons. Field Marshal, Habes al-Majali, was designated military governor 
and martial law commander in charge of a new military regime. The final drive of the 
Jordanian Army in its effort to sweep the guerrillas out of their last Jordanian bases in the 
Ajloun and Jerash took place in April 1971. Hundreds of casualties were inflicted on both 
sides in four days of savage fighting.70 
Soon after the end of hostilities, Black September, a group of younger Al-Fatah 
members who, apparently, opposed Arafat, began its terrorist attacks against Jordanian 
targets, including hijacking Royal Jordan Airlines planes and kidnapping diplomats. 
Jordanian Ambassador to London, Zayed Rifai, was shot, but injured only slightly. 
Jordanian Prime Minister, Wasfi al-Tal, was assassinated in Cairo on November 28, 1971 
by four Palestinian members of Black September. The group gathered new dissatisfied 
Palestinian recruits with a campaign of terrorism against those who they considered to be 
their enemies. The most shocking and well-planned guerrilla operation, perhaps in 
history, was Black September’s attack on the Israeli Olympic team in Munich, Germany 
on September 5, 1972. This incident widened the gap between extremist Palestinians and 
the rest of the world. 
There were still 20,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan, deployed to Jordan during the 1967 
war, remaining there upon a Jordanian agreement. At the same time, the neighboring 
Syrian regime was still under the control of the radical Ba’ath faction, who had first 
provided military training and equipment to PLO guerrillas and had, consequently, 
contributed to the initiation of the 1967 war. Both Ba’ath regimes were enemies of Arab 
monarchies, especially the Hashemites. 
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The PLO’s public criticism of Egypt’s acceptance of the Rogers Plan in 1970 
neutralized Egypt, helping King Hussein move against the PLO. However, even though 
King Hussein acted without explicit prior assurances of United States support against the 
PLO, he was hoping to get support from them,, But the king had, in fact, appealed to the 
US for assurances prior to his military confrontation with the attacking Syrian forces.71  
Nevertheless, US President Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger and other advisers in 
Washington discussed the possibility of intervention in either a rescue operation to save 
Americans in Amman, or a larger operation to save King Hussein.72  They decided to 
support Jordan if threatened. 
The Jordanian success in expelling the PLO and resisting the Syrian forces 
enhanced the Jordanian political position. The military challenge to Israel from Jordanian 
territory was ended, and most significantly, the PLO position as a strong rival for the 
leadership of the Palestinians in Jordan was eliminated. Generally speaking, the 
Palestinian-Jordanian population of the East Bank did not get involved in the civil war, 
with the exception of those in the refugee camps where PLO bases existed. As for the 
West Bankers, especially after the defeat of the PLO and the acceptance of major Arab 
states of the Jordanian policy for a political solution, they depended on Jordan for the 
removal of the Israeli occupation. For the PLO, the war increased their negative attitudes 
and views toward the Hashemites. But Arafat, on the other hand, repeated on every 
possible occasion that Al-Fatah had no wish or intention of overthrowing Hussein or 
other Arab rulers. Instead he blamed radical factions within the PLO for the civil war. 
Arafat said, “We are not in the business of revolution or ideology, our job is to liberate 
Palestine. But if we are forced to, we will fight anybody who tries to obstruct us in 
this.”73  At the Arab level, the civil war in Jordan had strained not only Jordanian-
Palestinian relations, but Jordanian-Arab relations, as demonstrated by the breaking of 
their relations with Syria, the closing of its borders, and the Syrian military intervention 
(which threatened to invite outside forces to intervene). 
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C. THE UNITED ARAB KINGDOM PLAN: 1972 
The direct result of the Jordanian civil war was, initially, the marginalization of 
the role of the PLO. From a strong position, where it had been freely able to share de 
facto authority of the state with Jordan, it found itself forced to seek refuge in Lebanon. 
They had to establish new political and military bases among a largely apolitical, and 
much less numerous, population of Palestinian refugees.74  For their part, while many 
Jordanian Palestinians agreed with the PLO aspirations of achieving an independent 
Palestinian state, they now had to deal with the existing reality of the Jordanian state 
away from previous PLO support. King Hussein repeatedly stated that the Palestinian 
identity ought to find proper expression within the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian 
partnership – a partnership which he said he cherished very much – in which no side 
should dominate the other.75  Yet the Jordanian civil war in 1970 that resulted in the 
expulsion of PLO fighters to Lebanon and Syria weakened the partnership. 
The Arab and Israeli competitors strove to take advantage of the deteriorating 
situation between Jordan and the PLO as a way to further weaken Jordanian-Palestinian 
relations, preferably to them, to a point of no return. For its part, the Jordanian 
government also sought to exploit its military gains over the PLO by exposing a new 
initiative that would wipe out Palestinian resentment toward Jordan in the aftermath of 
the September civil war. It would also serve to restore the Jordanian role in the Arab-
Israeli conflict that had been strained by the Six-Day War and the PLO rivalry. 
King Hussein wanted to restart his struggle to restore the West Bank through a 
partial or separate deal with Israel, as delegated by the Khartoum Arab Summit, held in 
the wake of the 1967 war. Hussein’s objective of negotiating for the return of the West 
Bank appeared to much of the public to be more practical than did the PLO strife of 
seeking “a secular, democratic, state in all-Palestinian territory” through a protracted 
guerrilla war.76  The king’s new efforts came to a halt in 1969-71 peace talks, however, 
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due to Israeli intransigence and PLO opposition. Thus, the Jordanian role again 
weakened. The overthrow of the Ba’ath regime in Syria by the pragmatic General al-
Assad was the only option they adopted, thereby weakening the PLO’s military strategy 
with regard to the Palestinian issue. 
In 1972, Hussein saw a chance on the horizon for new peace talks. He realized 
that the maintenance of Jordanian-Palestinian relations, cooled due to the events of 1970-
71, would be necessary for any peaceful solution. On March 15, 1972, Hussein 
announced the United Arab Kingdom Plan as a more appropriate framework for the 
development of a Jordanian-Palestinian partnership. The plan included a new federal 
constitutional structure for Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territories (after Israeli 
withdrawal).77  It also added the Gaza Strip to the West Bank structure. The plan 
envisaged a federal union between Jordan, on the one hand, and the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, on the other. Federal executive power, which was to be assumed by the king, would 
encompass foreign affairs, defense and national development.78 
It is interesting to note that Hussein resorted to a technique of his grandfather, 
Abdullah, of using territorial, institutional devices, in a complementary manner, to deal 
with nationalistic and political problems posed by the Palestinian question.79  The plan 
represented a conscious effort by the king to refute the PLO cry, as well as mounting 
propaganda that Jordan was bent on containing the Palestinian identity from developing. 
This also led to the fear that Palestinians would have a separate state, while at the same 
time, Jordan had been diligently preserving the letter and spirit of the unity of the 
Jordanian and Palestinian peoples since 1950. The Hashemites stated, in its defense, that 
the plan was intended to counter any initiatives to find an alternative homeland for the 
Palestinians outside their country. 
Jordan sent a number of envoys to tour the Arab world to explain the plan, but 
failing to persuade Arab leaders. Arab reactions to the king’s plan were swift. Egypt, 
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which encouraged Jordan in 1967 to unilaterally seek to restore the West Bank, broke off 
relations with Jordan over the plan. Syria also rejected the plan, and broke off relations 
with Jordan, the PLO accusing the king of impairing the Palestinian cause by proposing 
autonomy, rather than independence, for Palestinians.80  The project for a United 
Kingdom was quietly withdrawn, as the king and the Jordanian government no longer 
made reference to it.81 
The PLO continued to pursue its claim of being the sole representative of the 
Palestinian people, a claim always countered by the Jordanian government. In 1973, the 
PLO was recognized by the non-aligned nations at the fourth summit of the movement in 
Algiers as “a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” I In November, it was 
recognized by the Arab League in a secret resolution as “the sole representative of the 
Palestinian people.”  However, Jordan expressed its reservations. The issue of 
representation finally came to a close when the Arab states made their decision, at the 
seventh summit in Rabat in 1974, recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of Palestinian people everywhere, which was soon followed by 
international recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinians by the United Nations General Assembly.82  In response, King Hussein 
declared that Jordan no longer bore any political responsibility toward the Palestinian 
question, and that such responsibility should be shouldered by the PLO, itself.83 
In later years, as in his speech of February 1986 suspending the agreement 
between the PLO and Jordan, King Hussein referred to the United Arab Kingdom plan as 
an appeal to the PLO to demonstrate Jordan’s long-term commitment to Palestinian 
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D. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY VS. JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN 
RELATIONS 
Migration to, from and across Jordan since the Palestine exodus of 1948 has 
played a key role in the country’s politics, economy and society. These movements have 
several underlying interacting patterns. The main patterns are connected to regional 
geopolitics, the fluctuations of the oil economy in the Persian Gulf, and efforts of the 
Hashemite Kingdom to ensure its own stability. Jordan is an ideal case study for how 
various forms of mobility can have strong political and economic implications, both 
domestically and regionally. 
Jordan was established in 1921, within borders drawn by colonial powers. It soon 
became the first host nation for Palestinian refugees who arrived in several waves 
following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. These refugees formed a large and 
integral part of the kingdom’s population. This migration has constantly posed a 
challenge to the Jordanian regime in power at the time. At the same time, however, this 
migration has been an asset to the country’s economic development through the 
assistance received from the international community to help resettle and accommodate 
the refugees.84 
Thousands of Palestinians left Jordan to seek jobs in the Gulf states, especially in 
the early 1970s, when the oil boom bolstered the region. This involved labor exports to 
meet the oil-producing Gulf states’ demand for highly skilled workers and paid high 
salaries. The remittances received from those Palestinians, together with foreign aid, 
contributed to developing sectors of the Jordanian economy by providing start-up money 
for Jordanian businesses and for large state-sponsored projects.85 
Jordan is host to the largest number of Palestinian refugees of any single country 
in the world. The size of the Palestinian population in Jordan is such that it has allowed 
successive Israeli leaders to claim that “Jordan is Palestine.”  Therefore, in addition to the 
challenge of economically integrating the Palestinians, Jordanian regimes have always 
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aimed at controlling the independent expression of their political claims within the 
kingdom to prevent Jordan from becoming an alternative home to Palestinians and to 
preserve the rule of the Hashemites. The Palestinians’ political integration within Jordan 
was highly conditioned on their allegiance to a ruling monarchy that strove first to protect 
its own stability. Some Palestinians have accepted these terms, while others, especially 
educated ones, found the government’s stance unacceptable, thus choosing to emigrate 
from Jordan. The Jordanian-PLO struggle during the 1960s and 1970s polarized 
Jordanian society. The balance between Transjordanians and Palestinians within Jordan 
had come under strain. However, Jordanian supremacy in the 1970 events led the 
Jordanian regime to establish its identity as a Jordanian, not Palestinian, state.86  
Jordanization became part of the policy in order to foster the Jordanian national identity, 
thus evoking various preferences over what strategies were best suited for the 
government efforts to gain international support for Jordanian sovereignty. 
Jordanization encouraged Jordanians to stick to their national identity at domestic, 
regional and international levels as a response to any threats towards its existence. 
However, it also aroused a stronger, though often hushed, sense of Palestinian 
nationalism in Jordan. The rift was exacerbated by the development of a division of labor, 
with Palestinians dominating the private sector and Transjordanians dominating the 
public sector.87  International Monetary Fund and World Bank pressures undercut job 
security in the state sector and led to the widespread and vocal Transjordan resentment of 
Palestinian dominance in the private sector. To some extent, this division was evident 
before 1967, and had to do with the nature of the state and how it was set up. However, 
this division became much clearer after 1970-71 for a number of reasons.88  The first 
reason was that after 1970-71 the Palestinians were considered suspect, and their 
numbers were reduced in the security services and the government bureaucracy, as part of 
a policy of reorganizing the Jordanian house and the instruments of self-protection. This 
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process came as a result of the PLO policy towards Jordan in the early 1970s, and the 
Rabat summit resolution of 1974, which recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinians.  
The second reason was the repeated propagation of the notion voiced by Israeli 
right-wing leaders that Jordan was, in fact, Palestine.89  This increased the drive towards 
“Transjordanizing” the public sector and the security services, reducing the public profile 
of Palestinian-Jordanians. The third reason was the division of labor, by which 
Palestinians were able to take advantage of employment opportunities in the Gulf. 
Remittances pouring back into Jordan from the middle of the 1970s heightened the 
public-private sector divide. 
In 1996, a study conducted by Jordan University’s Center for Strategic Studies on 
the level of private sector capital participation in the country’s economy showed that 
Palestinian participation in the capital was much higher than Transjordanian 
participation.90 
The divisions between Palestinians and Jordanians in Jordan were manageable at 
a time of economic boom. However, they became much more difficult in the 1980s and 
1990s for several reasons. First, with the downturn in the economy in the 1980s, the IMF 
and World Bank advocated programs that threatened cuts in public and private sectors,, 
leading to Transjordanian resentment and Palestinian fears. Second, the 1991 Gulf crisis 
deepened the division with the expulsion of more than 300,000 Palestinians to Jordan, 
which increased Transjordanian fears that they were losing out to successive waves of 
Palestinian refugees. A third reason why divisions between Palestinians and 
Transjordanians emerged more forcefully resulted from King Hussein’s decision to 









                                                
By 1999, the Jordanian society debated many issues, such as Palestinian 
citizenship in Jordan; Palestinian supremacy in the private sector; and discrimination. The 
pan-Arabists and pan-Islamists both supported the notion of national unity between 
Palestinians and Jordanians. 
This review of the development in Jordan does not mean to necessarily imply that 
a conflict between Jordanians and Palestinians is imminent; nor does it indicate that 
democracy in Jordan has been reversed.91  
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IV. JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1980s AND 
EARLY 1990s 
A. PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AND THE PLO’S POLITICAL RISE 
Sadat signaled an abrupt and radical change in the Arab world starting in 1973 
when he, along with President Assad of Syria, launched the October War. On October 6, 
1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces surprised the Israelis in both the Suez Canal and Golan 
Heights. The fighting on both fronts ceased when the UN Security Council on October 
22, 1973 adopted Resolution 338, which called for parties to obey a cease-fire and start 
peace negotiations on the basis of Resolution 242 in order to reach a just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East.92   
The Arabs decided to meet to prepare for the peace talks. Accordingly, the Arab 
Summit was held in Algeria on November 26-28, 1973. The Summit’s resolution 
regarding the Palestinian question asserted its adherence to restoring the national rights of 
Palestinians, and also maintained that the PLO was the sole representative of the 
Palestinian people. Jordan expressed its objection to this last article, which would deprive 
it of representing the Palestinians who constituted a large portion of Jordan’s population.  
Jordan, in an attempt to paper over the Algerian decision, participated in the 
Geneva Conference. Rafai headed a Jordanian delegation and outlined Jordan’s position 
on the essential requirements of peace: Israel’s total withdrawal, evacuation of the Arab 
city of Jerusalem, and the right of all states in the region to have their territorial integrity 
and independence respected.93 
Again, the next Arab Summit in Rabat in 1974 adopted a resolution emphasizing 
the PLO as the sole Palestinian representative. Reluctantly, King Hussein joined the Arab 
consensus and accepted their decision. Both Palestinians and Transjordanians welcomed 
their decision. Soon after the king’s return to Jordan from Rabat (within 25 days) a new 
government was formed in Jordan. Palestinian representation in the parliament, which 
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was suspended at the same time this government was formed, was reduced from 46% to 
20%. The king sought to show his compliance with the Rabat resolution, urging the 
people of Jordan, both Transjordanians and Palestinians, to accept the resolution and 
support it.94  The king wanted to prevent any rupture and polarization among the people 
that might destabilize the country. In November 1974, Arafat addressed the UN General 
Assembly when the UN allowed the PLO to have an observer delegation to the United 
Nations. The UN approved the Rabat resolution. The Palestinians, with all such 
developments, became more optimistic that a solution to their problem was not as remote 
as some suggested. 
The Arab decisions with respect to Palestinian rights and representation adopted 
in both the Algeria and Rabat summits not only strengthened the PLO, but also saved it, 
as it strove to find a foothold in the international arena, regardless of its severe political 
and organizational deficiencies. After the 1973 war, the PLO became more rational, and 
even more aware of its capabilities and limitations. It realized that the military option 
espoused previously as the only option for liberating Palestine was no longer viable or 
practical by itself, but instead that a parallel lines diplomatic track was necessary, similar 
to the Syrian and Egyptian approach. 
Thus a major shift towards a moderate approach became a necessity, and the new 
reality made it unlikely that the PLO would continue to enjoy unequivocal support from 
Arab states. This increased the concern of the Palestinian leaders that if a compromise 
were reached over the West Bank and Gaza the PLO would not be included.95  The new 
political approach of the PLO coincided with the trends in the Arab world toward seeking 
a diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the Arab countries favored an 
active, independent Palestinian political role, since the pan-Arab ideals were declining 
during this period.96   
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The PLO was encouraged to follow steps similar to those taken by Egypt and 
Syria. The resurgence of the PLO was not due mainly because of the organization’s 
pragmatism or to the triumph of nationalistic policies in Egypt and Syria.97  The entire 
Arab context was favorable at that time. The Arab stand in 1973 was strengthened by the 
use of oil as a political weapon, which directed the world to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
before it was quickly refocused on the Gulf. Yet King Faisal’s famous stand, the use of 
the oil weapon during the war, led to the re-emergence of the old Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian 
coalition, which stood in favor of the PLO.98 This alliance was favorable to Jordan, 
whose relations with its members were weak and cool due to the adverse effects of the 
1970 clashes, as well as to the Jordanian stand on reactivation of the eastern front. This 
subject had generated controversy between Jordan, on one hand, and Iraq, Saudi Arabia 
and Syria, on the other. Since 1963, when Israel began to divert the waters of the River 
Jordan, and the subsequent Six-Day War, Arab states had demanded that Jordan allow the 
stationing of Arab troops on its borders with Israel. These countries also urged Jordan to 
allow fedayeen activities to be launched against Israel from Jordanian soil.99 
Jordan, however, had its own perception of the way the eastern front should be 
strengthened, and it did not see any military significance to allowing fedayeen activities 
to be launched from Jordanian soil. Jordan realized that such activities, and concentration 
of forces on its borders with Israel, would justify Israeli retaliation, not only against it, 
but also against adjacent Arab countries, as well. Jordanian strategists saw that the 
involvement of Arab countries in the fight against Israel would be achieved by deliberate 
and comprehensive political Arab strategy prior to deployment of forces. 
The constant strife of Arabs to dislodge Jordan from the West Bank contributed to 
the rise of the PLO's role. Some analysts believe that one reason for excluding Jordan 
from the planning and participation in the 1973 war was the desire on the part of Assad 
 




                                                
and Sadat to assign responsibility for the Palestinian problem to the PLO. This desire was 
crystallized in the Algiers-Rabat decisions of 1973-74.100 
As the regional environment became more favorable to the rise of the PLO, the 
international atmosphere and tendency seemed ripe for or, at least less hostile to, the 
establishment of a role for the organization in the West Bank and Gaza.101  According to 
Alan Hart, both King Faisal and Nixon became convinced that the PLO’s new political 
realism ought to be seized upon and rewarded by the establishment in the West Bank and 
Gaza of a Palestinian mini-state.102  Thus, the idea of national Palestinian leadership 
seemed to suit Kissinger’s step-by-step approach to policy in the Middle East. Kissinger, 
and for that matter Israel, preferred not to deal with the Arab side as a single negotiating 
bloc.103 
The Soviet Union’s relations with the PLO became more supportive, especially 
after the expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt in July 1972. The Soviets seemed more 
concerned about their role in the region, as Egypt and Jordan were viewed as pro-
western.104  The Soviets were alarmed by Kissinger’s step-by-step approach in the 
region, so they were keen to strengthen their relations with more radical Arabs, like the 
PLO, in order to maintain their interests in the region as well as be a key player in any 
peace settlement in the Middle East. 
B. PLO FRUSTRATION AND DIPLOMATIC OBSTACLES: 1974-1984 
The Palestinian representation, regardless of the Algeria-Rabat resolutions, 
remained an open and unsettled issue. Jordan and the PLO continued to view each other 
as rivals and competitors. However, the rivalry was not the only setback for Palestinians, 
but  factionalism  also  divided  the  movement into those who advocated a narrow policy  
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(such as “Palestine First”), or those who were pan-Arabist, or patrons of other ideologies. 
Furthermore, the split was accentuated by the social and political, as well as personal, 
backgrounds of Palestinian leaders. 
Fatah leaders were all founding members of the movement. They were all born in 
Palestine in late 1920, had grown up together, had coexisted and lived in the same 
environment with their families, having had similar experiences, particularly those 
associated with the Palestinian exodus in 1948. They had all been students in the 
Palestine Student Union, and participated in the resistance movement against Israel in 
1955 and 1956. They had also all been harassed by Nasser’s regime.105  Fatah leaders had 
formulated a concept that the struggle against Israel rested, above all, on the Palestinian 
people, whereas other Arab initiatives toward Israel were dictated by raison d’etat, and 
not by genuine commitment to the Palestinian cause.106  The leaders of other PLO 
factions were either non-Palestinians or non-Muslims who had been born outside of 
Palestine, they came from the middle class and their attachment to Palestine was 
ideological, not nationalistic. They opted for hard-line policies. 
The PLO division also coincided with a similar one among Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza, which was also divided along political and social lines. Some of 
them favored closer association with Jordan, while others preferred a pro-PLO option, 
often even differing on what constituted the Palestinian entity. In 1967, more than 200 
leading, Palestinian figures made known their opposition to the establishment of a 
Palestinian entity, in whatever form and under whatever name, and declared that the 
elimination of the effects of Israel’s aggression demanded pan-Arab responsibility.107  
Other prominent Palestinian notables in the West Bank and Gaza attempted to cooperate 
with Israel and secure status as recognized leaders. Some of these notables contacted 
Israeli authorities and tested their reaction to the formation of a Palestine state beholden 
to Israel, in one way or another.108  
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There was, of course, in the West Bank and Gaza a strong national movement that 
identified with the PLO. The main objectives of this movement were the rejection of the 
Israelis’ occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, unity of the Jordanian and Palestinian 
people, a just peace that would ensure the right of self-determination to the Palestinian 
people, and coordination between efforts for their cause that came from inside or outside 
Palestinians.109 
In the post-1973 era, it was the PLO, not the rival Arab countries, that tried to 
unsettle Jordan’s influence in the West Bank. The new Palestinian leadership was seen as 
descendents of the Mufti and his followers, who used the Arab arena to further spread its 
anti-Jordan policies, as their ancestors had against Hashemites from 1920 to 1950.110 
The Jordanian regime, along with the Palestinians, were concerned about the fate 
of the occupied territories, believing that abandoning the West Bank would leave a 
vacuum to be filled by the PLO. They worried that an independent, radical state in the 
West Bank and Gaza could unleash irredentist pressures among Palestinian refugees and 
pro-PLO elements in Jordan. Israel could use Jordan’s withdrawal from the contest as a 
pretext for annexation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the expulsion of the Palestinian 
people to Jordan would further endanger the Hashemite regime in Jordan. 
Israel refused to deal with the PLO under any circumstances, and the United 
States took the same attitude. US government conditions for recognition of a state were 
difficult for the PLO to meet. However, the cooperation of both countries was necessary 
for peace. This cooperation became more important as the Arabs and the PLO opted for a 
political solution rather than a military one. Eventually, the US and Israel became 
involved in the determination of the Palestinian representation when they showed their 
preference dealing with Jordan on the Palestinian issue, rather than the PLO.111 
Despite the PLO mistakes in Jordan in 1970, the Arab League voted in 1973 and 
1974 for Palestinian representation to be the PLO’s comprehensive responsibility, in spite 
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of it’s being weak, fragmented and ill-equipped to take on such responsibility. As a 
result, King Hussein started the Jordanization process in the regime and administration. 
The Arab leaders who earlier pressed the king to meet the demands of the PLO appealed 
to him later not to continue his policy of Jordanization.  
The PLO, still, attempted to exploit the Rabat decision of 1974 to the fullest 
extent possible. It practically established veto power over any peace arrangement, which 
fell short of its demands. Furthermore, it used the occasion to undermine Jordan’s 
influence in the West Bank and among Palestinians in Jordan.112  It wanted Jordan to 
continue to provide economic and administrative assistance to the Palestinians, while 
leaving the role of political leadership to the PLO. Having lost its political and military 
base in Jordan, the PLO attempted to regain a footing, since Jordan’s legal clout was 
necessary to counter Israel’s claim that there was no party more entitled than it was to the 
West Bank.113  The Rabat decision called on Jordanians and the PLO to put the decision 
into effect. They discussed the future of the West Bank after liberation. They disagreed 
on two issues: first, whether to try to settle its future status, at this stage, while the 
territory was under occupation, or await the elimination of Israel, or instead whether to let 
the Palestinians decide for themselves; and second, whether to have a federation or 
confederation between the two entities, as the PLO insisted on determining in advance 
the future relationship with Jordan. It seemed strange that the two sides negotiated over 
something neither possessed.114 
The Arab political system was not stable. From 1975-1977 Egypt and Syria 
pressed Arafat to come to an agreement with Jordan as soon as possible. The PLO 
obliged, and effectively dropped most of its earlier demands, except the need to 
determine a priori the future regime of the West Bank and Gaza. Jordan insisted on its 
United Arab Kingdom plan, while the PLO reiterated its demand to first establish an 
independent state, which could then join a federal or confederal framework.115 
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Under mounting pressure from both Assad and Sadat, Arafat agreed in 1976 that 
Jordan and the prospective Palestinians should form a federation.116  This was intended 
to assure the Israelis that there would be no Palestinian state in Palestine in the future. 
The eighth Arab Summit, in Cairo in October 1976, reinstated Jordan’s central role in the 
West Bank because of Jordan’s international role on behalf of the Palestinians. Jordan 
was more internationally accepted in this role than the PLO, as was the case during the 
Geneva peace conference.117   
Internal division and external constraints upon the PLO further weakened its new 
status, thereby becoming more of a burden on the shoulders of Arab states, which had 
earlier supported all Arab Summit decisions with respect to the organization’s special 
status as the sole representative and responsible for Palestinians’ affairs. The PLO, 
divided into factions, did not agree to attend a possible new session of the Geneva 
conference that the United States and USSR were pushing to reconvene. But the dilemma 
for the Palestinians was the representation issue. Israel and the United States still banned 
the participation of the PLO. The Arab states indicated to the PLO that it would have to 
accept any compromised solution that could be found by the Arab states and the United 
States for its representation in Geneva. Most Arab states, including Egypt, Syria and 
Saudi Arabia, supported the idea of a link between a Palestinian entity and Jordan. This 
idea was crystallized in 1977, shortly before Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem in November. 
Eventually, Egypt reached a peace deal with Israel and exited from the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Egypt, thereby, changed the balance of power in the Middle East and led to its 
expulsion from the Arab League. The PLO rejected the EC Venice Declaration of June 
13, 1980, which called for a comprehensive peace settlement on the basis of Security 
Council resolutions 242 and 338. 
In September 1982, President Reagan launched his peace initiative, or plan for 
peace in the Middle East. The plan supported the idea of a federal system between two 
states, Jordan and Palestine. Despite its acceptance of the principle of Palestinian 
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independence, Jordan still favored a strong Jordanian-Palestinian connection.118  Jordan 
welcomed the plan as positive and called it the most courageous stand taken by an 
American administration since 1956.119 
Until the Madrid conference, Israel opposed the establishment of a Palestinian 
state in the West Bank, and its leaders continued to object to the involvement of the PLO 
in the peace process. However, the Jordanian peace policy which had been formulated 
had called for the involvement of all parties in any envisioned settlement. In the absence 
of a peace settlement, the Middle East region would continue to be a source of extremism 
and terrorism for all sides. 
C. HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT: FEBRUARY 1985 
King Hussein had tried to reach a political solution with Israel through 
international auspices based on the principle of the exchange of land for peace, as 
embodied in UN Resolution 242, since the Six-Day War. However, his efforts were 
hindered by, among other obstacles, the rise of the PLO and its internationally recognized 
status as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people as endorsed by the 
Rabat Arab Summit of 1974. During the 1970s, however, the main stream of the PLO, 
led by Fatah’s Arafat, had in fact directed the political process through focusing on 
diplomacy over military means. Such a trend facilitated its recognition by the 
international community for representing the Palestinian people as endorsed by the Rabat 
Arab Summit. However, the PLO’s hopes were frustrated by the Israelis, with support of 
the US, rejection in dealing with the PLO. The only option in this dilemma was through 
PLO cooperation with Jordan for negotiations in the short term. This way, Jordan could 
combine its international status and acceptability to Israel with the PLO representative 
role, and popular support among the Palestinians in the Diaspora and the occupied 
territories in a joint political stand.120 
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However, there were many obstacles to this approach. First, there was the civil 
war legacy of bitterness and distrust on both sides. From the Jordanian perspective, the 
dangers of cooperation with the PLO might lead the PLO to try, once again, to attempt to 
assert its leadership over the East Bank Jordanian-Palestinians, or it might resume its 
military activity and provoke Israeli direct reprisals against Jordan. Even if Arafat was 
personally sincere, which Jordan doubted, there was the reality that the PLO was a 
coalition of many different groups, of many loyalties beholden to different patrons.  This 
exposed the largely moderate group and leadership of Fatah to pressures from radicals, 
leftists and communist elements. Arafat was well aware of these constraints. 
Undoubtedly, he, along with other Palestinians, still remembered the dark days of the 
1970 civil war, perhaps sharing with Palestinians the suspicion that an agreement with 
King Hussein could be used to exploit the PLO and give legitimacy to the Hashemites to 
restore the occupied territory to their control. 
In the period separating the Syrian-inspired revolt in the ranks of al-Fatah forces 
in Lebanon (May 1983), and the conclusion of the King Hussein-Arafat February 1985 
accord in Amman, Jordan’s and Arafat’s political views converged. Jordan’s main 
concern remained the fear that Israel would annex the occupied territories. In September 
1984, King Hussein felt at ease when Shimon Peres took back the seat of prime ministry 
in Israel, unfortunately only for a two-year term. King Hussein felt that it gave him an 
opportunity to maneuver for peace. King Hussein was aware that without a solid and 
credible Palestinian partner to share with him the risks of negotiating with Israel, the task 
would be hard. The only Palestinian people who could shoulder this heavy burden with 
him were the PLO and Arafat, who still held the precarious mandate of the Rabat summit 
as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.121 
The representation mandate, too, was in serious danger due to Arafat’s decreasing 
credibility after his forced departure and removal from Lebanon, in addition to the 
fighting that erupted among al-Fatah factions. Ironically, for the PLO, these 
developments drew attention to the role the inhabitants of the occupied territories might 
 
121 Abdollah Frangi, The PLO and Palestine. London: Monthly Review Press, 1983. 
69 
                                                
play in any peaceful settlement. This required the Hashemites to exert their efforts to 
enhance the position of Arafat in the occupied territories, and even within the PLO. 
The Palestinian National Council held its last session on February 16, 1983 in 
Algeria. The meeting was preceded by public criticism of Arafat’s late negotiations with 
King Hussein regarding accepting the Reagan plan as a first step toward international 
negotiations, led by the PFLP and DFLP. The PNC had rejected the Reagan plan. 
However, it had accepted a key article of the plan – i.e., a confederation of Palestine and 
Jordan. A confederation could be concluded only after the independence of Palestine, and 
on the basis of two independent states.122 
The renewed fighting in Lebanon as well as the rebellion within Fatah against 
Arafat by rival Palestinian groups supported by Syria made it clear that Arafat needed to 
make a choice: either embrace a more militant strategy, endorsed by the PNC to leave 
Arafat with the titular leadership of a united organization, or lead his moderate wing into 
an alliance with King Hussein, based on establishing a joint negotiation team and a 
confederation.123  It was not known if Arafat would make it to the scheduled PNC 
meeting in Amman which would be boycotted by major parties, the PFLP and DFLP, and 
perhaps his attendance would contribute to an acute split in the PLO.124  Eventually, the 
benefits Arafat would harvest from Amman would be significant. 
Jordanian television was used as a means of propaganda to rally PLO supporters 
and hold the pro-Arafat majority in the occupied territories to their loyalty and allegiance. 
Furthermore, he obtained administrative and organizational benefits by being allowed to 
reactivate the operations of Fatah offices in Amman that had been closed in the aftermath 
of the civil war in 1970. The reopening of such offices increased Arafat’s contacts with 
his supporters in the West Bank and Gaza. The PLO always feared losing their prestige, 
which would move King Hussein to gain the West Bankers’ support and cooperation to 
enter into negotiations. Although it might be hard to accept such a hypothesis, the 
situation on the ground in the occupied territories was always changing. Israel’s coalition 
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government at the time was exercising heavy pressures on the people in the occupied 
territories. King Hussein’s arguments that such pressures were a real threat to the 
existence of people on Palestinian soil, along with the hope that there was an appropriate 
opportunity for the start of negotiations based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, the 
United States (Reagan) plan, the Arab consensus and with a rational Israeli negotiator 
(Peres), began to have an impact upon most people, including loyal PLO supporters. One 
prominent PLO official from the West Bank commented privately, “If King Hussein 
really could negotiate the return of most of the occupied territories, he would be a hero on 
the West Bank, and Arafat would be finished.”125 
In fact, by the conclusion of the Camp David Accords, together with the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in March 1979, the Arab opposition countries forced Arafat 
to cooperate and meet Jordanian demands. At the Arab level, the joint Jordanian-PLO 
committee administered the distribution of Arab aid, allocated during the Baghdad 
Summit in 1979, designed to enhance the solidarity of the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories. The National Guidance Committee, primarily and in a response to Camp 
David, brought together the pro-PLO mayors, who won the town councils’ elections, with 
the defeated pro-Jordanians. Although the other pro-Jordanian elected officials, Frayis in 
Bethlehem and al-Shawa in Gaza, were not members, a pro-Jordanian faction did, in fact, 
exist among the apparent pro-PLO committee. Out of 23 members, ten were mainstream 
Fatah supporters, four from the PLO rejectionist camp and four had pro-Jordanian 
tendencies.126  Each group attempted to dominate the committee, which led to its 
ineffectiveness. The leftist main concern was an increased level of cooperation and a 
form of alliance between pro-Fatah elements and pro-Jordanians, aimed at restricting the 
hard-line leftist forces. Unlike the leftists, the moderates tended to maintain, and even 
promote, contacts with Jordan and were hesitant to confront the Israeli government. They 
did not even like Jordan’s participation in the distribution of pan-Arab aid under the 
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agreement reached at the Baghdad summit in 1978. The National Guidance Committee 
was weak and in jeopardy before it was banned by the Begin government in 1982. 127 
It was obvious that the coordination and cooperation between pro-Jordanians and 
pro-Arafat loyalists continued, and even developed, as the PLO lost its bases in Lebanon. 
The division and struggle within the organization served the pro-Jordanians as Arafat’s 
loyalists attempted to increase their support. Fatah and Arafat periodically dealt and met 
with pro-Jordanian leaders while some pan-Arab funds allotted to the PLO were spent to 
gain the backing of pro-Jordanian politicians, who now became more respectable as they 
were often involved in direct contacts between Chairman Arafat and King Hussein.128   
It was evident that there were a lot of political elites in the West Bank and Gaza 
who strongly supported, and even proposed, an alliance between Jordan and the PLO 
toward securing Israeli withdrawal. King Hussein addressed these elites during the 
seventeenth PNC in Amman on November 22, 1984.129  He praised their solidarity in 
preserving independent decision-making by resisting the attempts which tried to prevent 
the conference from being held. The king described the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship 
as special. He invoked the holy status of Jerusalem as “the invaders’ threshold to Jordan,” 
and said that Jordan was the gateway to Palestine. He asserted the need for cooperation in 
order to restore the special Jordanian-Palestinian relationship that had been missing from 
Arab and Palestinian actions. He stated that the Jordanian-Palestinian option required 
sticking to UN Resolution 242, based on the principle of the exchange of land for peace 
as a viable basis for any peace formula initiated. This constituted a general framework for 
any international peace conference under UN auspices and was not negotiable .The PLO 
had to attend the conference on equal footing with other parties. The king indicated that 
the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship in the future should be worked out by both peoples: 
“No one has the right to determine this relationship on their behalf or interfere with it, 
whether he is an enemy, brother, or friend.”  The last words of his address were directed 
to people under occupation: “The occupied territories can endure no courtesies or one-
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upsmanship. Both are weapons we put in the enemy’s hands that would help him to 
quickly complete his plans and projects for annexing the territory and expelling its 
inhabitants.”130 
For his part, Arafat’s views complemented the king’s words and vision by 
announcing his intent to move toward finding a political solution through international 
conference, based upon, as he said, “adherence to international resolutions over 
legitimacy.”  He asserted his commitment to the independence of Jordan besides an 
independent Palestine:  
We clearly declare this so that no one or party will have an illusion about 
any alternative homeland except Palestine. All of us should stand side-by-
side in solidarity with our brothers and people in Jordan in order to destroy 
Sharon and his dreams and to respond to his serious threat to Jordan.131 
As a result, negotiations to draw up a formal agreement were immediately opened 
and intensified at the start of the new year and over the following months until they 
produced the February 11, 1985 Amman Accord. The agreements included the following 
clauses relative to the principles and mechanism for settlement: 
1. Land in exchange for peace, as cited in the UN Resolution, 
including the Security Council Resolution; 
2. The right of self-determination when the Jordanians and 
Palestinians move to achieve the above within the framework pan-
Arab confederation that is intended to be established between the 
two states; 
3. Negotiations within the framework of an international conference 
under UN auspices, consisting of the five permanent members of 
the Security Council and all parties to the conflict including the 
PLO, which is the Palestinian sole legitimate representative, within 
a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.132 
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The Amman accord was widely supported by the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories, but within it the PLO disagreement emerged. The PFLP and PDFLP opposed 
the accord, as did Syria. However, the Arab Summit in Casablanca, Morocco approved it. 
The United States' stand was neither rejection nor acceptance of all clauses. The US and 
Jordan were involved in diplomatic discussions over the international conference and the 
status of the PLO. The Soviet Union refused to support the accord. The PLO was very 
reluctant to accept UN Resolution 242 unequivocally. Arafat insisted on American 
endorsement of Palestinian self-determination and direct dialogue with the PLO.133  The 
intensified diplomatic efforts failed to convince Arafat to change his stand. On February 
19, 1986, King Hussein regrettably announced the suspension of the agreement with the 
PLO. The irony of this painstaking diplomatic event was that King Hussein, even just 
before the official negotiations over the agreement began, thought that the weakness of 
the PLO would make it more flexible, whereas Arafat finally realized that no settlements 
would be made with the PLO, the hard figure, as he called it.134 
A review of the accord indicated that the failure of the Amman agreement was 
caused by two basic differences in interpretation. First, the UN resolutions are cited in 
general and not specified by name and number. Second was the achievement of self-
determination and confederation between Palestine and Israel. 
The Jordanians and the Palestinians were very close to reaching the required 
degree of coordination necessary to start negotiations. The clear precondition of the 
Americans for the PLO to participate in negotiations was the endorsement of UN 242, 
which Arafat had always evaded, by saying that they endorsed all UN resolutions. The 
Amman agreement cited the UN resolution as the first point, in the context of the 
principle of “Land for peace” which is primarily UN 242. What Arafat had in fact 
endorsed was the resolution, specifically.135 
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As for the establishment of a future confederation between Jordan and Palestine, 
King Hussein indicated that Palestinian self-determination would take effect as soon as 
the territories were restored. King Hussein and Arafat agreed on the issue of conducting 
negotiations through an international conference under UN auspices and with 
participation of all parties, including the PLO, within a joint Palestinian-Jordanian 
delegation, and on the basis of UN 242 and UN 338. Accordingly, King Hussein issued a 
statement in Washington in May 1985 urging the PLO to negotiate.136 
In January 1986, the United States declared that the PLO should publicly state its 
acceptance of the two UN resolutions in order to receive an invitation to any international 
conference, including renouncing terrorism and being willing to negotiate peace with 
Israel. After long and intensive talks in Amman in January and February, the PLO 
conditioned its endorsement of UN 242 on the approval and recognition of the Palestinian 
self-determination in the context of Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.137 
It was evident from King Hussein’s speech in the aftermath of suspending the 
Amman accord with the PLO, as well as from interviews later on, that the issue of 
Palestinian self-determination was behind his decision. This issue, not an international 
conference, was a matter for both peoples to decide. The fears emerged that, in the worst 
case scenario, an internationally recognized and guaranteed Palestinian state would have 
a more secure status than Jordan itself, and would well claim to represent the Palestinians 
of the East Bank, as they had attempted in 1970. The king said of this, 
We agreed on everything. Then they came to talk of the issue of self-
determination. In our dialogue with them we have not reached this degree 
of details…we wished that they had said from the beginning, what is 
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Jordan, again, showed its mistrust and bitterness toward the PLO for not seizing 
the initiatives and opportunities that might never be available again. Regretting this, the 
king said, “Jordan opened the door for them, but they continued to move in empty 
circles…We need to get results for this issue before it is too late.”139 
D. DISENGAGEMENT: 1988 
The suspension of the 1985 Jordanian-Palestinian Amman Accord did not affect 
the two peoples’ relations, as much as it affected the collapse of relations with the PLO. 
Jordan maintained its contacts and administrative support to the people in the West Bank, 
in spite of the Algiers-Rabat decisions. The king had tried, at every opportunity, to 
express concerns and fears about the sufferings of the Palestinian people under 
occupation. Besides, he had kept them informed of the political developments, and 
Jordanians continued efforts, at different levels, to solve their problem by securing Israeli 
withdrawal from the occupied territories. Therefore, when in February 1986 he 
suspended the Amman Accord with the PLO, that had taken much time and effort, he 
addressed the people under occupation about the causes contributing to this outcome, 
mainly the PLO’s inability, divisiveness and evasiveness. In his speech after suspension 
of the accord, the king gave a full account of the situation and turned the matter over, 
once again, to the Palestinians in the occupied territories and Diaspora, as well as Arab 
capitals and organizations.140  The king wanted to make clear to the Palestinians that they 
were the real arbiters in the struggle for independence, on one hand, and on the other, he 
wanted to assure them of Jordan’s support if they chose to take action. 
Israel tried to exploit the Jordanian-PLO division by encouraging the Palestinians 
to free themselves from the PLO. Jordan launched a five-year development plan to boost 
the economic situation of the occupied territories, as well as to decrease their dependency 
on the Israeli economy. The aim of such an economic plan was to give the Palestinians 
more political options. The PLO rejected this plan, as being a means employed by Jordan 
to promote its prestige in front of Palestinians, and to weaken the PLO’s respect in the 
eyes of Palestinians in the occupied territories. However, some Palestinians praised the 
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plan in public, calling on other Arabs to follow Jordan. Prominent Palestinian elites, such 
as Elias Freig, of Bethlehem, and al-Shawwa, of Gaza urged the Palestinians to pay 
tribute and express gratitude to Jordan’s leadership. Freig said, “We breathe through 
Jordan; it is our gate to the Arab world…The West Bank is totally dependent on Jordan 
economically, politically, geographically and psychologically.”141 
The PLO maneuvered to undermine the Jordanian plan for development. The PLO 
representative to the UN demanded a formal and public condemnation of the plan. The 
Arab countries that were oil-rich restricted the distribution of its funds to the occupied 
territories, only allowing it to come through the established Jordanian-Palestinian 
Committee, against the PLO’s wishes to put it under its administration. Many Palestinian 
commentators violently opposed the Jordanian plan. Al-Fajr described it as a Jordanian-
Israeli plan to eliminate the PLO influence and put an end to Palestinian aspirations for 
independent statehood.142 
The PLO attempted to draw closer to Israel by encouraging a Palestinian-Israeli 
dialogue in an endeavor to win over Israeli public opinion. Writers, journalists, 
academics and peace activists from both sides met and exchanged views and ideas. 
Jordan initially feared such contacts, until it realized the main objective of the talks was 
for the PLO to change its old image in the Israelis’ minds into a more moderate one – just 
like other PLO propaganda. As the Palestinian Intifada broke out in Gaza and spread to 
the West Bank, new leaders arose, and soon became empowered, asking Arafat to be 
more forthcoming on diplomatic efforts sponsored by third parties, particularly the 
United States.143 
By mid-1988 a new Palestinian leading group began to appear, including leaders 
of the underground and old diplomats who sought Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, such as 
Hanna Siniora, Sri Nusseibq, and Faisal al-Husseini. Arafat, under pressure from the 
newly confident Palestinian interior, had to ignore an earlier decision, preventing Siniora 
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from meeting US Secretary of State, George Schultz. In mid-July, the same group, and 
the head of the Arab Studies Center in Jerusalem, met with Dutch foreign minister, Hans 
Vander Brock. The power of Palestinians inside the occupied territories strengthened the 
hands of moderate elements within the PLO itself. During the Arab Summit meeting in 
Algiers in early June 1988, the PLO representative, Bussam Abu-Sharif, one of Arafat's 
advisers, circulated a document calling for direct talks between Palestinian and Israeli 
leaders in order to resolve the Palestinian problem on the basis of a two-state solution. 
The document, which was generally assumed to have Arafat's endorsement, defined the 
PLO's ultimate aim was to bring a free, dignified and secure life, not only to Palestinian 
children, but also to Israeli children.144  The Intifada had strengthened the PLO’s drive to 
outline and chart its own diplomatic campaign toward Israel, independently, without 
waiting for other initiatives or directives. 
The most dangerous development that shook Jordan's long-standing attitude that 
the West Bank was still officially an integral part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
was the Intifada. . According to Adnan Abu-Odeh, King Hussein’s political adviser, 
himself of Palestinian origin, the Palestinian uprising was a watershed to Jordan’s 
relations with the West Bank. It showed that the Palestinians who were seeking self-
determination interpreted his remarks to clearly mean he favored Palestinian 
independence. Although Israel was their first, and most immediate target, they still 
viewed any partnership with Jordan as an admission of such independence.145  
Furthermore, the Intifada represented a large segment of Palestinian people living under 
occupation who had shifted the loci of activity away from the PLO to the occupied 
territories. It also demonstrated that the Intifada would play a leading role in the debate 
over the future of Palestine. It displeased Jordan, after a 20-year-long bitter contest 
between Hashemites and the PLO as to which one should speak for Palestinians in the 
occupied territories, that it was now clear the Palestinians wished to speak for 
themselves. Thus the center of gravity of the Palestinian struggle for freedom, which 
before had moved from Damascus, Amman, Beirut and Tunis, now shifted to Gaza, 
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Nablus, and Jerusalem and to hundreds of previously anonymous villages and refugee 
camps in the occupied territories. With the increased momentum of the uncontrollable 
Intifada, and with Arafat's procrastination and Israeli intransigence, Jordan's diplomatic 
efforts to revive the peace process were again thwarted. Their efforts were cut short by 
both Israel and the PLO. Jordan had to stop the initiation of the democratic process since 
election under occupation seemed inconceivable. Also, the Intifada, although directed 
against Israeli occupation, raised questions about the wisdom of Jordan's continued 
political and financial investment in the West Bank.146 Jordan was afraid that the new 
Palestinian uprising would spread eastward to Jordan, where large numbers of pro-
Intifada were located. Jordanian worries and concerns had been justified, given the fact 
that the United National Leadership of Intifada threatened pro-Jordanian figures, 
especially members of the Jordanian parliament in the West Bank, as well as members of 
the Jordanian regime.  
Intifada, Abu Odeh said, “provided the opportunity for Jordan to review its 
policy.”147  On July 28, 1988 Jordan canceled the five-year economic development plan 
for the occupied territories, and on July 30, the king dissolved the parliament, half of its 
members representing the West Bank. On July 31, the king announced his decision to 
commence administrative and legal disengagement from the West Bank. The king’s 
emotional and religious adherence as a Hashemite to Jerusalem excluded it from this 
decision, and Jordan continues to provide guardianship to the Islamic sites in the Holy 
City. 
Jordan’s move shocked most observers and had an impact on all parties involved 
in Palestinian affairs and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Each side was forced to make 
adjustments. All parties, including Israel, the US and the PLO were obliged to find a way 
out from Palestinian representation without Jordanian involvement. King Hussein's move 
was mainly an attempt to drive the concerned parties to act and abandon their evasiveness 
and delaying tactics. Israel, as declared on many occasions, refused to deal with the PLO, 
or to give up land for it, preferring to do so through a settlement with Jordan. However, 
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the PLO wanted self-determination without it having to cooperate with Jordan. The 
Jordanian disengagement decision coincided with the election in Israel, and both Likud 
and Labor parties described the Jordanian move as strategic in nature. They never thought 
that Jordan would, one day, entirely distance itself from the Palestinian question. 
However, they eventually came to believe it. The US explained the Jordanian move as a 
political tactic adopted by King Hussein, directed to the people of the West Bank, and 
aimed at making them realize that the ultimate solution to their issue is a confederation of 
the West Bank and Jordan.148 
Palestinians in the West Bank began to draw their own maps and identify their 
interests. Palestinian elites began to discuss their vision of a two-state solution. The PNC, 
convened only four months after the Jordanian disengagement, endorsed the notion of a 
two-state solution, as well as their public acceptance of UN 242, which they had refused 
to accept since 1967. During this conference, Arafat was elected chairman. The new 
flexibility in the PLO policy toward peace did not get an Israeli response until Shamir 
and, before him Rabin, suggested conducting elections in Gaza and the West Bank to 
choose whom they could negotiate a framework for autonomy with. This option did not 
work due to its impracticability in meeting the minimum level of Palestinian aspirations.  
On his visit to the United States in April 1989, Shamir suggested a four-point peace 
initiative, which also didn’t work. 
A Palestinian religious group expressed its resentment over Israel’s harsh punitive 
measures against Intifada activists, as well as against the increased concessions presented 
to Israel by the PLO.  It also resented the deadlock on the political front.149  This group, 
of Islamic tradition and having grown up in the West Bank, had the support of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in confronting the PLO. Israel took advantage of their rise and gave 
them space to challenge the PLO. Later on, the group was identified by the name Hamas. 
From  the  1990s  to  the present, PLO-Hamas relations have been fluctuating due to their  
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different views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and strategies for conducting it. Israel, 
for its part, has always been involved internally in trying to end the Intifada, as well 
externally. 
E. PALESTINIANS UNDER THE JORDANIAN UMBRELLA AT THE 
MADRID PEACE CONFERENCE 
The idea of an International Peace Conference for the Middle East is not recent. 
The form it has taken at present actually dates back to the time when Security Council 
Resolution 338 was passed during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. The Security Council 
demanded the full implementation of Resolution 242, under the appropriate auspices, and 
the opening of negotiations between the parties concerned. An international peace 
conference was held in Geneva from August 23 to September 7, 1983. Out of 157 
members of the United Nations, 137 attended the conference.  However, it was boycotted 
by Israel and the United States. The 1983 conference issued a declaration demanding that 
a real conference be held under UN auspices with the participation of all parties 
concerned, including the PLO, plus the US, the USSR and other countries. The United 
States refused to deal with the PLO, and they adopted certain conditions that the PLO 
must meet before joining any international peace conference. The United States began 
contacts with the PLO in December 1988, after the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist, 
accepted UN resolutions 242 and 338 (resolutions that called for an exchange of land for 
peace, and renounced terrorism, respectively).150 
The Madrid Peace Conference began on October 30, 1991, with the backing of 
the United States after the end of the Gulf War, under the chairmanship of the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The conference was held on the eve of the demise of the 
Soviet Union, which created a change not only in the prevailing balance of power 
between Arab confronting states and Israel, but conflicting parties’ perceptions of the 
conflict changed, as well. The use of force to implement the UN resolution against Iraq 
reminded many of several UN resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict. existing 
only on paper, without action, due to Israeli rejection (always backed by the U.S). The 
US was accused of double standards. The US took this into consideration and declared 
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that the Palestine issue would be dealt with soon. The destruction of Iraqi power 
weakened the Arab regional order, which became part of the broader Middle East order, 
in which countries such as Turkey, Israel and Iran compete for hegemony. In Jordan’s 
view, the existence of the United States in the region, mainly in the Gulf area, helps 
maintain the stability and security of the region, in addition to protecting US interests.  
Fulfilling his words, President H. W. Bush announced on March 6, 1991 (in the 
wake of the Gulf War) that he would pursue Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. He 
dispatched Secretary of State, James Baker, to the Middle East, where he met with 
Palestinian leaders from the occupied territories.151  Baker’s eight trips to the region, 
along with his contacts with the Palestinians, Jordanians, Israelis, Syrians, Egyptians and 
others led to peace talks in Madrid on October 30, 1991.152  At Madrid and subsequent 
meetings, the United States and Israel formally treated the Palestinians as part of the 
Jordanian delegation, not as a separate entity. 
Baker had background knowledge of the conflicts, as well as possessing 
knowledge of the concerns and demands of each party, all of which he had formed when 
he tried in 1989-1990 to convince the Israelis and the Palestinians to negotiate a plan for 
autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. Baker was confronted with the impediment posed 
by the ambiguous Palestinian representation. The Israelis still refused to deal with the 
PLO. Differences over Jerusalem and the settlements were another problem he had to 
address.  
The US decided to exclude the PLO from participating in the conference due to its 
having sided with Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War. According to Baker, the 
PLO had effectively destroyed itself. In the projected peace, then, the Palestinians would 
not be represented by the PLO.153  The solution to this obstacle faced by the US would be 
either to leave it to Jordan to select representatives, or select representatives from the 
occupied territory. King Hussein declared, in a preemptive signal, that Jordan would not 
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serve as a substitute for the Palestinians under any circumstances.154  However, the 
Jordanian Foreign Minister at the time, Taher Al-Masri, himself of Palestinian origin, 
told Secretary of State Baker that Jordan had planned, during the 1985 Amman Accord 
with Palestine, to form a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to negotiate a peace 
settlement with Israel. Al-Masri reiterated that Jordan did not seek to represent 
Palestinians; however, it would be willing to form a joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation in order to provide an umbrella for them if they wanted it.155 
King Hussein made it clear that the Palestinians inside the occupied territories 
should decide, and whose views should be addressed. The king said in an interview: 
The real Palestinian nationalist, in my opinion, is the one who has been 
subject to hardship for years, much more than someone who is sitting 
outside the territories pontificating about nationalist matters from a 
position of comfort…people who have lived far from hardships, that have 
lasted all these many years, have no right to offer advice on what must and 
must not be done.156 
Baker visited the region on March 10, and met Palestinian representatives from 
the territories who were not PLO members, but who were loyal to it, as the PLO was 
flexible in approaching the peace process. It was even ready to give concessions to the 
United States in order to accept its representation of Palestinians if required, and its 
continued contacts with the interior produced loyal people who would serve these 
objectives. 
The time was passing quickly, and the composition and form of the Palestinian 
delegation was not yet resolved. Israel insisted it had to agree on the members provided 
that there would be no one among the members from the Diaspora or Jerusalem. After 
checking all options, it was found that a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation under the 
Jordanian umbrella would be feasible and acceptable to Israel and the US. Although 
Jordan did not impose or ask to provide the umbrella, but accepted the idea in accordance 
with its moral obligations toward their Palestinian brethren. Thus, they were able to 
 
154 New York Times, March 12, 1991. 
155 Interview with Al-Masri, Jordanian television, April 13, 1991. 
156 Jerusalem Post, August 22, 1991. 
83 
                                                
participate and decide on their own future, since Jordan was no longer representing them. 
Still, the Palestinians expressed their concern about the Jordanian stand. The Palestinian 
spokesperson for the delegation, Hanan Ashrawi, explained that the option of the joint 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation depended on whether there was enough long-term 
political agreement with Jordan based on equality and respect for each side’s 
sovereignty.157 
Jordan was used as a “bridge” for the Palestinians to cross in arriving at the peace 
conference; however, this raised political concerns for the Palestinians. The parties to the 
conference agreed on a two-track approach for negotiations: between the Arab states and 
Israel, and between Israel and the Palestinians. Also the parties agreed that Palestinian-
Israeli negotiations would include two phases: the first phase of which would lead to 
Palestinian interim self-rule for five years; the second phase would include the remaining 
and outstanding issues, to be settled mutually, by both the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
To eliminate Palestinian concerns and suspicion toward Jordan, King Hussein, in 
a May press conference with Secretary of State Baker, said that Jordan favored the joint 
delegation idea, but he emphasized that only the Palestinian members in the delegation 
would address their issues with Israel.158  He felt that the Palestinians had to refer to 
Jordan to organize this delegation and its functions. In October, the PLO sent a delegation 
to Jordan to organize and coordinate the procedural matters of Palestinian representation. 
The Palestinian delegation, under PLO guidance, stressed their distinct status. Both sides 
agreed upon the joint delegation and produced a working plan. It outlined the 
composition of both delegations, and allowed for each side to assign one or two members 
to attend the other side’s negotiations with Israel at the Madrid conference. Eventually, 
the Palestinian representation was accomplished in a way that enabled them to participate 
in the peace conference through the Jordanian umbrella. 
The first four rounds of Arab-Israeli peace talks were held in Washington, DC, 
under US auspices. The fourth round of bilateral talks in March 1992, this time among 
the four Arab delegations (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians), ended in a 
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stalemate. The Israeli negotiators asserted their claim that the West Bank and Gaza were 
disputed territories, since no side had proper sovereignty over them before 1967. While 
the PLO had delegated Jordan to negotiate with Israel to restore the occupied territories, 
and Jordan could easily address its legal claims to the lands on the basis of Resolution 
242, the lack of an agreement between Jordanians and Palestinians on the issue of 
sovereignty undermined Jordan’s ability to address the proper legal claims to land.159 
The Palestinian National Council urged the PLO to make continued Palestinian 
participation in the peace talks with Israel conditional on recognition of the PLO as the 
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.160  Palestinian leaders were 
astonished by the PLO suggestion, which brought back the confederation idea with 
Jordan, which would undercut their efforts to establish an independent sovereign entity 
separate from Jordan. Some analyzed the proposal as a tactical move to overcome the 
Israeli arguments about the status of the occupied territories. 
The PLO had not abandoned its endeavors to be the official, main Palestinian 
actor involved in the negotiations. During the peace talks in Washington, Shamir, the 
Israeli prime minister, did not grant any concessions of territories to the Palestinians, but 
he had delayed the process, the delay indirectly serving the PLO. As time went by, the 
Palestinians were forced to negotiate more directly. 
New Israeli-Palestinian contacts took place in 1992, through the good will of the 
Norwegian government, who were on reasonably good terms with both parties. The main 
architect behind the plan was Johan Jorgen Holst, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Terje Rod-Larson and Mona Juul. The negotiations were conducted in total 
secrecy, until signed on August 20, 1993, to the surprise of most countries including 
Jordan and Palestinian leaders. 
Jordanians and Palestinians, after the entire struggle to be active members of the 
new, broader Middle East, still had to decide on the form of their future relations through 
an accepted formula. 
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V. SCENARIOS FOR FUTURE RELATIONS 
The history of Jordanian-Palestinian relations is characterized by tension and 
misunderstanding. Mutual suspicion and mistrust have been apparent, not only in the 
leadership, but between members of the two communities in both the east and west banks 
of the Jordan River. Each side has often accused the other of conspiracy and betrayal. 
The struggle of between the leaders on both banks, over time, and since Abdullah I’s 
attempts to annex Palestine to his dynasty, have generated different perceptions, by which 
each side views the other. The early tension and struggle for power between King 
Abdullah and the Mufti (and his group) has continued on both sides, although the actors 
and policies have differed.  
Differences in the views among certain leading individuals have influenced their 
judgment, often negatively affecting their actions and consequently the entire 
relationship.161  The legacy of the past struggle over Palestine has made the Palestinians 
fear that Jordan may yet try to reclaim the West Bank for Jordan, not Palestine. The 
repeated accusations that the Hashemites were dealing with the Israelis have further 
complicated the relations. On the Jordanian side, the lessons learned from the events of 
the 1970’swhen the PLO often attempted to take over Jordan’s dominance in the area has 
overshadowed any improvement in their relations. Relations did eventually improve, 
however, reaching a high point following the 1990-91 Gulf War, when there was joint 
participation at the Madrid Conference. However, relations suffered a setback when 
Jordan learned of the secret Oslo talks. Eventually, a group of Jordanian nationalists 
started to push for hardening the Jordanian stand, away from the Palestinian issue, fearing 
that this would destabilize Jordan. Moreover, this hard-line, East Bank nationalist group 
began to suspect that King Hussein might have his own agenda, namely in attempting to 
recruit Palestinian support for his leadership from both banks.  Conversely, the 
Palestinians feared that the King might try to obstruct the emergence of an independent 
Palestinian statehood setup on Palestinian soil. Another major concern for the East 
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Bankers has been the domination of Palestinians’ the private sector wealth by Jordan. 
Thus, there was fear that Jordan would harvest the benefits of any economic growth, 
whereas the East Bankers working mostly in the public sector would lose out. 162 
Reviewing the history of Jordanian-Palestinian relations, a clear need arises to 
restructure their future. These relations had, more or less, been integrated up to the 1967 
war. They then took on different forms, due to the rise of new Palestinian actors, as well 
as to changes at the regional and international levels. Future Jordanian-Palestinian 
relations will recognize that the Palestinian National Authority has done much—they 
have labored toward the establishment of institutions, in the hope that future negotiations 
with Israel would culminate in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The 
political formula that should govern future Jordanian-Palestinian relations will be decided 
by the people and leadership of both peoples. If not affected by Arab and regional actors, 
the result may be a form of confederation or separation, since the Hashemite federal 
option was not welcomed by Palestinians. 
A. THE CONFEDERATION SCENARIO: A PALESTINIAN OPTION 
A confederation is a contractual union of states, whose members retain 
sovereignty, where several unities are so connected so as to constitute one body politic. In 
a confederation, sovereignty is entirely retained by the constituent units and, instead, 
power is transmitted from the lower level to the high. The central organs of a confederal 
arrangement do not have direct jurisdiction over the citizens of its constituent states. The 
ultimate power or sovereignty resides in the individual units making up the 
confederation. These forms of relations were repeated often up until the Oslo talks and 
the Declaration of Principles in 1993 between Israel and the PLO. In the realm of 
international relations, a confederation is not a form of government that has rigid rules or 
concrete definitions. While Palestinians tends to interpret a confederation as a sort of 
union of states, Jordanians prefer to describe it in terms of merely a way to get the closest 
relations between both sides. The Palestinian interpretation involves a particular legal 
political framework, which was significant from their point of view.163  The Palestinian 
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perception of confederation might exclude any sort of federal or unitary ties with Jordan. 
This is why whenever Palestinian leaders discuss the probability of confederation with 
Jordan; they directly tie this notion to the creation or establishment of a Palestinian state. 
Up to the present time, both sides have differing notions of just what a confederation, or a 
state, is. Moreover, the majority of the populations of Jordan and Palestinian do not agree 
on confederation, federation, or any form of political unification. Palestinian elites differ 
from their people, in viewing confederations as a sort of unofficial arrangement that can 
be enacted by a joint political pronouncement. Hanan Ashrawi commented on reports 
released about a possible Jordanian-Palestinian agreement to establish a “Jordanstine” by 
saying, “The idea was raised as part of a search for cover for Palestinians, and we are 
talking about a political, not constitutional, confederation with Jordan.”164  When the 
Palestinians were looking to achieve a juridical unity of the Palestinian people, one of the 
PLO’s key aims, it is trying to create a distinctive Palestinian entity in the occupied 
territories. 
Palestinian elites debated the feasibility and importance of formulating confederal 
arrangements with Jordan. One of the prominent Palestinian political figures, Faisal Al-
Husseini, announced publicly that the confederation idea with Jordan was meant to solve 
some important issues, which would arise after the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state, such as borders of the state and its requisites.165  While Ashrawi 
focused on using this confederation as a means of diplomacy aimed at establishing 
independence, Al-Husseini believed that this sort of relation would be most important 
after obtaining independence. A more liberal Palestinian perception of the confederation 
was the one elaborated by Khalid Al-Hassan, the chief of the foreign committee of the 
Palestinian National Authority. Al-Hassan proposed establishing a triangle of 
confederation consisting of Jordan, Israel and Palestinians that closely resembles the 
Swiss type of confederation.166 
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Although the Jordanian government tried in the past to encourage the PLO to 
come to an agreement with Jordan on some restructuring of Jordanian-Palestinian 
relations, the PLO avoided committing itself to any form, awaiting solutions that would 
lead to independence and the founding of a distinct entity. The current Jordanian policy is 
focused on Jordan first, and concerns how to move forward and promote its stagnant 
economy, but still it would offer its support to the Palestinians in search of peace and 
independence. King Hussein, influenced by Jordanian nationalist pressures, told Arafat to 
drop the word confederation from his political dictionary, and not to discuss the idea with 
him anymore, not even any other forms.167 
It seems that the sides are not ready to discuss the confederation idea. They are 
influenced by past experiences, i.e., when they competed for control and dominance of 
the same territory, and when they fought each other in Jordan. The present circumstances, 
as well as the uncertainties of future solutions to the conflict, tend to support this trend. 
Jordanians realized that the Palestinians wanted to use the confederation idea, in the short 
run, to exploit political advantages rather than long-term association, as verbalized in 
King Hussein’s proposed 1972 United Arab Kingdom. 
The Jordanian government has apparently calculated that the potential benefits 
from such a future association outweigh the risks. Palestinians used the idea to preempt 
any Jordanian-Israeli agreement and to overcome the Israeli refusal to discuss territorial 
issues, in addition to using it to eliminate Israeli fears of a Palestinian state in the future. 
Furthermore, the idea reminded the Palestinians in Diaspora of one of the PLO’s non-
negotiable goals: the unity of the Palestinian people.168  The Palestinian tactics of using 
this idea made Jordanians realize that there was a lack of sincerity to preserve the unity of 
the two sides, but, instead, it was being used as a means to achieve political ends. 
Eventually, amidst contrasting views, the two sides have preferred to wait until a final 
solution is reached before being certain that the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations will 
actually lead to an Israeli withdrawal. If this were not to occur, Jordanian officials would 
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not prefer a confederation with a stateless people. This concern is justified, especially 
since the parties have failed to reach a deal on outstanding issues left from Oslo to the 
present. Refugee issues, as one of these outstanding issues in addition to Jerusalem and 
water rights, are a key issue to Jordan. .Jordan hosts 41%of Palestinian refugees and 90% 
of displaced persons (DPs).169  The refugees who fled Palestine after the 1948 war and 
1967 constituted about 60% of the total refugees. Some acquired Jordanian citizenship, 
and a large number preferred not to, in the hope of a quick return to their homes. After 
the Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, a new cut-off date became 
determining. 170  Three weeks afterward, on August 20, the Jordanian government issued 
a statement that defined Palestinians as all permanent residents of the West Bank as of 
July 13, 1988.171  Still, above all, the legal status of Palestinians was affected by the 
union of Jordan and the West Bank in 1950, when unification did not prejudice the 
Palestinians rights to reside in their historic homeland.172 
The Declaration of Principles (DOP) between the Palestinians and Israel was an 
abrupt development in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinians negotiated alone with 
the Israelis in Oslo to address the Palestinian question, separate from other Arab issues, 
as the Israelis always preferred. Practically, the PLO has become the Palestinian 
representative, as demonstrated in these negotiations, which imply Israel’s recognition of 
the PLO. 
Palestinians in Jordan, mainly members of influential groups, such as the pro-
Hashemite, Palestinian prominent families and the leaders of the private sector, are in 
favor of an association with Jordan, whether a settlement on the occupied territories is 
reached or not. On the other hand, a large segment of groups among the East Jordanian 
community prefer that Jordan maintain its policy of disengagement with regards to the 
Palestinian issue. However, the Hashemites’ long-standing vision (i.e., since King 
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Abdullah’s rule) has been in support of Arab federation. Therefore, people often assume 
that the Hashemites would not mind the federation idea. For this reason, Palestinian 
leaders and people keep repeating this notion of unity, whether in sincerity or for political 
reasons. The regional powers, including Arab states and Israel, have their interests and 
preferences of the future form of governance in the occupied territories. Israel prefers to 
deal with Jordan in this context, rather than with a Palestinian state. The Arab states 
would like to see an independent state in the occupied territories after the withdrawal of 
Israel if the ongoing peace process succeeds.  
The war in Iraq has made the situation in the Middle East even more unstable. 
The balance of power, which was already in favor of Israel, has been exacerbated, and the 
Iraqi threat eliminated. This gives Israel an upper hand in imposing its will on the Arabs, 
especially the Palestinians who have had to meet hard conditions before the peace 
process is revived again. As for unavoidable Jordanian-Palestinian relations, both sides 
have, at this stage, accepted the status quo and manage their affairs on an ad hoc basis. 
This management was restricted to daily procedural relations and never reached a level of 
political coordination, even at critical times, like the Madrid Conference, when the 
Palestinian delegation arrived too late for joint coordination, and they were not prepared 
to fully negotiate their issues. 
As mentioned before, suspicion and lack of trust between the two sides were not 
new, but have reached their highest levels twice.173  First, the PLO went to Oslo and 
reached an accord with Israel without prior notice or coordination with Jordan. Second, 
the Palestinians signed an economic agreement with Israel in Cairo, on May 4, 1994, on 
the scope of the Gaza-Jericho agreement. Jordan expressed its resentment toward the 
PLO for disregarding Jordanian economic interests. Jordan’s frustration with the PLO 
attitudes was demonstrated in Amman’s reaction to the Cairo agreement. King Hussein 
did not respond to President Mubarak’s invitation to attend the signing ceremonies. 
However, Jordan sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs to attend the ceremony in an effort 
to avoid further degradation of already-strained Jordanian-Egyptian relations.174  
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Jordanian officials expressed their dissatisfaction with the deal. The Gaza-Jericho 
agreement, coupled with the economic accord, amounted to a PLO decision to disengage 
from Jordan and merge with Israel.175  With this step, declared a Jordanian official, 
Arafat dealt the coup de grace to chances of a further link between Jordan and 
Palestine.176  Jordanian leaders accused Palestinians of yielding to Israeli pressures at the 
expense of Jordanian interests and the prospects of long relations between both sides. 
The Palestinians were trying to establish bilateral relations with Israel, thinking 
that such relations would be advantageous in establishing a joint Palestinian-Israeli 
approach not only at an economic level, but also as a step toward a joint stand in response 
to regional issues in the future. A Palestinian official said in this regard, “Irrespective of 
what might have been the actual motives of the PLO leadership, the agreements provide 
the basis for both an Israeli hegemonic position in Palestinian affairs as well as potential 
cooperation, possibly strategic, toward third parties in the region in the future.”177 
It was evident that Jordanian-Palestinian cooperation did not exist, which meant 
that no understanding was reached to best serve their interests. A sense of competition 
and rivalry continues, and this explains why the PLO coordinates more closely with Cairo 
– which Jordan sees as having created the PLO as anti-Hashemites during the Arab Cold 
War – than Amman and the PLO remained loyal to the Egyptian approach. 
The concept of building a confederation has failed at the Arab level. The notion 
has only consolidated divisiveness and aggravated contradictions between various Arab 
regimes. It has also encouraged foreign intervention and failed to facilitate the building of 
a coherent community of interests between Arab states.178  The current Palestinian 
leadership proposed the establishment of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation only as a 
unity of convenience. It enabled the Palestinian leadership to work independent of Jordan 
while preserving its links with Palestinians there.179  More importantly, lip service to 
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confederation, even if taken seriously, still keeps the PLO in good stead with its Arab 
confederalist mentors. However, the formula that led to its failure would seem to be 
inappropriate for future interaction.180 
Jordan wants to build a strong and transparent relationship with the Palestinians, 
stemming from strong historical bonds, regardless of some incidents that muddied the 
atmosphere for some time. This will tie between the Jordanian and Palestinian people 
together, as well as away from Arab solidarity. Jordanian concerns are not restricted to 
the present time, nor to the economic field. It recognizes PLO rapprochement to Israel, or 
its regional alignment with the Egyptian-Saudi axis, and is concerned with these options 
in the future.181  Due to the demographic structure, and in absence of mutual 
demographic parity between Jordan and any future Palestinian government in the West 
Bank, East Bank Jordanians fear that formal association with the Palestinians will end up 
absorbing them. East Bank Jordanians put more emphasis on Jordan’s stability and 
integrity; however, at the same time, they support the Palestinians’ strife to preserve their 
national unity. 
The confederation system proved to be impotent at the Arab level and would also 
not work for Jordanians and Palestinians, since both sides have suffered as a result of this 
system during the Arab Cold War, preventing the establishment of a viable Arab order. It 
is not practical to continue the current status quo without any vision toward the future. 
Thus both sides should cooperate and consolidate their relations in preparation for the 
future, when a Palestinian independent entity is established. 
In approaching this undertaking, Palestinians will confront many obstacles. For 
example, they need to build a state and a nation from scratch; they need time to move and 
organize; there are some commitments with Israel that tie their hands on the economic 
side, which is attached to Israel by earlier arrangements. They need to lay out the kind of 
entity they want to establish, as well as a clear vision of what kind of polity they need. In 
this case, they could address other remaining social, security and economic development 
issues. Israel would encourage a form of interdependence with the Palestinians, and this 
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would increase their domination of Palestinian affairs. However, regardless of the size, 
quantity of work and difficulties to be burdened by Palestinians, this should not prevent 
them from working with Jordanians to draw out their future relations based on mutual 
respect and welfare for both. If a Palestinian state comes into existence at the end of 
future peace talks, it should be independent, not beholden to any powers. To make 
Jordanian-Palestinian relations stronger, the issue of major concern to Jordan, i.e., the 
refugee situation, should be solved in a way acceptable to Jordan, which has been 
accommodating them for many decades. 
B. SEPARATION SCENARIO 
Separation should come as a result of the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state or entity separate and distinct from the Jordanian state. It could come 
about as a consequence of Palestinian efforts to reach a peace settlement and end the 
Israeli occupation. Once the occupation is ended, sovereignty and independence will be 
achieved. The other Palestinian alternative would be their choice to separate from Jordan, 
as they achieve independence from Jordan. Once this separation takes place, it will 
include separation of legal, political, educational and welfare systems. 
Separation between both sides, in fact, was noticed as leadership reduced 
cooperation, and preferred to deal separately with Israel. It is quite possible that each side 
may establish close links with a third party which is stronger than their own, mutual 
links. For example, it is expected that Palestine could get closer to Egypt, or Israel, and 
Jordan could get closer to another country in the region. But it is also expected that their 
links would be limited. Palestinians should be cautious that if they drifted toward 
separation from Jordan while consolidating their independence from Israel, they might be 
pushed, indirectly, to depend on Israel, simply because they had been separated from 
Jordan and could not be easily accepted by Jordan to revert back for cooperation. 
Separation could lead to such outcomes. 
Palestinians, especially their leadership, may look to separation from Jordan as a 
main objective toward independence. Simultaneously, they might find this an occasion to 
show their determination to bury the Jordanian objectives that clashed over the years with 
Palestinian goals for independence. 
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As discussed before, Jordanians and Palestinians are waiting to see the final status 
of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. If it leads to a viable Palestinian state, separation from 
Jordan would be the Palestinian choice, and in its interest. However, if it leads only to 
self-rule, or non-viable state and control by Israel, which is more likely, the Palestinians 
would remain weak and apt to Israeli control since they are the ones in the driver’s seat. 
The separation scenario might be realized in stages. Israeli acquiescence will be 
necessary for Palestinians to achieve aspirations of an independent state on their soil, but 
the scenario presupposes that the Palestinians, with Jordan’s acquiescence, are set on a 
course leading toward a Palestinian state, which is not only independent from Israel, but 
also dissociated with Jordan, and which has a separate identity.182  If the emerging 
Palestinian state asserts its separate entity, and without proposing any form of association 
with Jordan, it will become a key member in the Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli triangle, 
functioning on an equal footing with the other two state actors, in terms of government-
to-government transactions.  This will pull Jordan and Palestine apart rather than bringing 
them closer together, and will put obstacles in the way of any third party, including Israel, 
which might prefer their integration. 
Separation might become inevitable as a result of a Palestinian quest for 
independence from Israel. It is possible to discern actors in both Palestine and Jordan for 
whom separation would be the desired outcome. They will be the main contributors to its 
realization, who will be able to tap into the residual distrust of one another by 
Palestinians and Jordanians. 
The Jordanian involvement in Palestine over the years has led some Palestinians 
to suspect that Jordan still has a desire in Palestine, and still aims to preclude Palestinians 
from real total independence there. Likewise, the legacy of events that culminated in the 
civil war in Jordan with Palestinians in 1970 has generated fear and anxiety for 
Jordanians that Palestinians might hope to make Jordan their home. At the same time, the 
road has been opened for separation as a result of Jordan’s decision to disengage from the  
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West Bank in 1988 and the rise of a Palestinian entity under the leadership of Yasser 
Arafat, and now Abu Mazen, and the PA endorsed by the Oslo process. The contributory 
forces that would influence or bring about the separation are:183 
1. Political Leadership 
Whether separation is an aim, and not just the result, of the Palestinian search for 
independence from Israel, the Palestinian leadership in the PA and PLO are likely the 
political actors who will contribute to this end.  The PLO leadership has a logical, 
historical reason to look at the Jordanian leadership with suspicion. Moreover, Jordanian 
contacts with the Israelis over the years have fueled PLO fear and distrust.184 
The Palestinian focus is centered on an independent state in the West Bank and 
Gaza, with Jerusalem as a capital. When the PLO went to Oslo secretly, they abandoned 
the pretense of Arab solidarity with either the Jordanians or the Syrians. Their relations 
with Syria are so strained that they can expect no real assistance from President Assad. At 
the same time, their contacts with Jordan, although more frequent, are still characterized 
by mutual suspicion. The PLO thinks that the only Arab country whom they can 
constantly turn to for support is Egypt, because from the PLO’s perspective, the Egyptian 
leadership can be counted on not to compete with its national preferences.185 
Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel came almost a year after signing the DOP in 
1993 between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This one-year period was characterized by 
poor informal relations between Jordan and Israel for leaving the Jordanian leadership in 
the dark during Oslo. Arafat strengthened his position and leadership by assuring the 
Israelis during Oslo of his intentions to relieve their security concerns. His initial state-
building exercise concentrated on strengthening the PA police force and bureaucracy, 
keeping decision-making under his control, and if needed delegated authority, though 
minimally, to his loyalists. Accordingly, a number of posts in his administration were 
given to loyalists. He had no inclination to share powers with rivals inside Palestine, or 
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even outside of it. The Israeli hard-line government could set about undermining Arafat’s 
position, but would be hard-pressed to find a substitute for the Palestinian security forces 
to police the Palestinian community, and thereby help protect Israel.186 
Oslo contributed to widening the gap in Jordanian-Palestinian relations, as well as 
led the Jordanian public, especially hard-line Transjordanians, to press the government 
for separation. Jordan has been, ever since Oslo, committed to avoiding any direct 
engagement in the dealings between the Israeli government and the Palestinian 
leadership.187  As part of their tit-for-tat policy, Palestinians have not been consulted or 
notified of the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement, and their leadership was affronted by 
the provision in the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty for King Hussein to retain the role of 
guardianship of the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. Arafat tried in 1996 to replace the 
Jordanian Waqf employees, but he failed in this effort due to the king’s opposition and 
Israeli rejection. 
2. Political Systems 
After Oslo, the PA was established and the Palestinian legislative council was 
elected. Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank led to an outcome that contributed 
to the establishment of the Palestinian political system, separate from that of Jordan. The 
qualities of the two systems are distinct. Through the PA and its security apparatus, 
Arafat created multiple and competing channels to the center of power. In Jordan, the 
king maintains a balance between different elements in the society.188  
With respect to their actual power, the Jordanian legislature began to gain more 
power, especially after the 1989 elections, whereas in the Palestinian council power is 
still weak. Neither is supreme over the executive, but the forms this takes differs. The 
Palestinian system is more centralized, as Arafat did not like to share power with others. 
The Palestinian legislative council has been a force for separation, but the process of 
disassembling the old inherited legal structure, and drawing a new one, has been delayed 
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by the debate between the legislature and the executive. The debate had been open until 
Arafat and the PLO managed to minimize its publicity. There is a sort of disillusionment 
in the system. In Jordan this sense of disillusionment was also found, but to a lesser 
degree that has to do with the power of the legislative toward the executive. In Jordan’s 
1997 election, for example, the Islamist Action Front boycotted the election, claiming 
that successive governments had intervened in the process at the expense of democracy. 
They opposed changes in the electoral law in 1993, which reduced the number of Islamist 
deputies to half the strength it had in 1989.189  Although the king constitutionally had the 
power to alter the law, to the Islamists’ reasoning it was undemocratic. 
In Jordan, the judiciary works independently, and the king does not determine or 
interfere in the court verdicts, whereas in Palestine the president, himself, is used as a tool 
to reinforce separation. In Palestine courts operate at the level of summary justice to 
conduct military tribunals secretly, which passes sentences within hours of an arrest. The 
PA weakened and marginalized the formal judicial system by substituting other means of 
conflict resolution. The PA reinforced separation by preventing the implementation of 
existing Jordanian law in the West Bank. The PA objective is to have its own regulation 
and legislation systems that assert independence and separate entity. 
Three points are of relevance here for the separation scenario. First, the links, 
which bound West Bankers to the Jordanian political system have been formally ended 
with the abolition of seats for them in the legislature, and the establishment of a separate 
Palestinian electoral process for both parliament and a president.190  Second, the way the 
two systems are structured and conducted gives the decisive power to the head of state, 
which, in the Palestinian case, is set on separation.191  Third, residual links to Jordan 
through the legal infrastructure in the West Bank are being ignored or dismantled.192 
Separation is underway since the Palestinians are adopting a whole new set of laws to 
substitute the Jordanian law in the West Bank. 
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3. Political Parties 
The political parties in Palestine have been undergoing a change from their role of 
armed struggle against Israel to their new role of participation in consolidating the 
Palestinian authority. They do not think that future relations with Jordan are a pressing 
issue. The PLO factions and prominent leaders continue to wave the flag of 
confederation, whether for tactical deliberation in their dealings with Israel or not. Fatah 
also believes this issue will be dealt with in the proper time, since it is involved in 
mobilizing Palestinians toward the Palestinian question; however, its leaders have not 
hidden their suspicion of Jordan. Other Palestinian factions of leftist communists and 
socialist ideologies are opponents to the peace process, and above all they oppose 
Jordanian policies, and have never stopped calling for separation. 
The Islamist groups have not expressed their stand on this subject, although they 
opposed King Hussein’s disengagement decision. Their perception of unity is very broad 
and more comprehensive, calling for uniting all Muslim nations. This trend was adopted 
by Hamas, Muslims Brotherhood and Islamist Action Front in both Jordan and Palestine. 
Jordan’s separation is demanded by the Transjordan nationalists, since it is 
considered the best tool to enhance and assert their identity in Jordan, once the 
Palestinian identity moves entirely westward. The other Jordanian groups that prefer 
separation are political groups, which share common ground with the PLO in seeking 
independence. Contrary to leftists in Palestine, the leftists in Jordan, paradoxically, 
moved toward the Islamist camp, only regarding the issue of Jordanian-Palestinian 
relations, calling for maintaining contacts and links with Palestine and waving the flag of 
Arab unity. 
King Hussein became more conscious of the Palestinian inclination toward 
separation when they accused him in 1995-96 of playing the Hamas card. They claimed 
that Hamas attacks on Israel may not have been discouraged by Jordan in an effort to 
undermine Arafat and the PLO’s role in the peace process.193  The accusation was refuted  
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bitterly by the Jordanian government and deepened its frustration at the PA, and made the 
Jordanian government more willing than before to stop all coordination with the PA and 
PLO due to their attitudes. 
4. Elites 
It is well known in Jordan that nationals of Palestinian origin predominate in the 
private sector, whereas Transjordanians take up the public sector. This generalization is 
mainly reliable, however, connections and alliances exist at the most senior levels of 
both, and key individuals may move from the private sector to the public sector and back 
again easily. However, insofar as Jordanians of Palestinian origin support the nationalist 
cause of their brethren across the river, they may be nervous about the consequences for 
themselves, inside Jordan, if they are seen to be more loyal to Palestine than to the 
kingdom.194 
In both Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, elite status derives from service to 
the state at senior levels, as well as from professional status, social heritage and 
independent wealth.195  All elites, whether those working in the state bureaucracy and 
apparatus or in the private sector, are capable of influencing development. In Palestine 
there are three classes of elites: social, economic and political. These elites vary from rich 
commercial dealers, who were pro-Jordanian until recently, to those in the state 
bureaucracy and those who control the security services as lower class. In Jordan the 
elites within state bureaucracy and security services are Transjordanian, and the private 
sector elites are mostly of Palestinian origin. 
The elites’ attitudes towards separation vary on both sides. Family ties override 
other considerations. Transjordanians may be guided by their ideology and preference for 
separation. It is expected that state elites act to increase the state’s powers and profits, 
which would generate competition between Jordanian and Palestinian senior employees. 
They might compete for international support from external powers and donor states. 
Consequently, these elites in both Jordan and Palestine will prefer separation, and they 
will hasten its steps. 
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5. Refugees 
Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Jordan has received several waves 
of Palestinian refugees. Two waves of refugees arrived from Palestine in 1948 and 1967, 
and the last one arrived from Kuwait immediately following the 1991 Gulf War. 
According to UNRWA’s figures for June 2003, Palestinian refugees and their 
descendants registered with and clients of the UN agencies number over 1.7 million of 
Jordan’s total population of 5.5 million.196 
Between them, Jordan, Israel and Palestine could solve the refugee problem. 
However, Israel’s declared position is obviously against the implementation of the right 
of return of Palestinian refugees within the 1948 borders of Israel. Many questions have 
been raised around their citizenship, and the distinction between a refugee and a 
displaced person. Awaiting a solution to the problem, Jordan issued them passports. 
Some are considered Jordanian citizens, while others, including those in Gaza, are not. 
If formal separation were a prospect, it would be necessary to work out who 
should negotiate with Israel over the fate of refugees - Jordan, the PA or both. The 
Jordanian leadership regards the issue of refugees as of strategic importance and the more 
real the possibility of separation, the more likely the Jordanian leadership would be to 
demand involvement in decisions on the refugee question.197 
The displaced persons issue should also be solved. The possibility exists that 
Jordan could deprive them of their political rights and ask the Palestinian entity to 
accommodate them, which would deeply affect Jordanian-Palestinian relations. The 
question of identity of all Palestinians in Jordan will be on the table, giving rise to such 
uncertainty among Jordanians of Palestinian origin that a crisis could result with the 
potential to destabilize Jordan.198  Separation would cut off both refugees and displaced 
persons in Jordan if they could not relocate to the Palestinian entity.199 
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6. Media and Public Opinion 
Media and public opinion will highlight the uncertainties, people's concern and 
contentions on the issues of identity and citizenship pertaining to large numbers of 
refugees and displaced persons in Jordan under the separation scenario. The status quo 
has put these issues on hold until more plausible scenarios arise upon which their fate 
would be determined.  
Palestinian public reaction depends on the prospects for a Palestinian state as a 
goal for their leadership. If there is little progress towards agreement between Israel and 
the Palestinians, then the Palestinian populace will be forced to wonder what they stand 
to gain ultimately.200  This would move the people to look to Jordan as being their safety 
guarantor. This would also generate a divide between aspirations and practicality.201  The 
Palestinian media could be expected to highlight the case of the leadership for 
independent statehood, but individuals could not deliberately cut ties with Jordan for the 
sake of realizing that goal, unless it were real. This separation might be supported by 
Jordanian press since it achieves Palestinians’ goals. However, public opinion would be 
divided on benefits and disadvantages for the average person, the elites, and 
businesspeople. 
As for economic factors affecting separation, similarities between Jordanian and 
Palestinian economies could make them competitors. Regardless of the shortcomings 
both economies suffer from, there is no sign of cooperation. Although the Palestinian 
economy’s integration into the region is limited, its dependence on Israel is pervasive. 
The economic agreements they signed with Israel bound and limited their economic 
options. Such economic agreements demonstrate separation from the Jordanian economy 
and reduced Jordanian-Palestinian cooperation. However, it seems that political 
difference  and  competition  overshadowed  economic  cooperation, and separation in the  
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economic sphere went along. It has been suggested that economic separation between 
Jordan and Palestine is near when one can see Israeli and Egyptian goods and suppliers 
substituted for Jordanian ones. 
7. Regional and International Factors 
The international community is awaiting progress in the peace process, especially 
between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and Syria. Neither the United 
States nor Europe has expressed their views on how Jordanian-Palestinian relations 
should be. 202  They hope that the peace process would end up in a just and acceptable 
peace that all parties in the region would embrace. The Arab states have no interest in 
promoting the Jordanian-Palestinian relations, and most Arab countries support the idea 
of an independent Palestinian state, without connections to Jordan. Egypt is particularly 
supportive of this idea. 
Apart from their role in protecting civil rights and citizenship, civil society 
organizations and NGOs in both Jordan and Palestine are against separation. Jordanian 
professional organizations have been in the forefront of resistance to normalization of 
relations with Israel, which could imply their assertion of the unity of the two peoples. 
These organizations, due to the occupation, have not yet figured out how to conduct 
themselves under the PA. 
In conclusion, this scenario offers clear political advantages to elements on both 
sides, but also explains economic drawbacks from an increase in Jordanian-Palestinian 
economic competition, once separation is initiated. Separation would not offer an easy 
solution to unresolved issues, such as the granting of passports, identity and the refugee 
situation, if these were not resolved by agreement within the ongoing peace process. 
Finally, expectations and aspirations remain uncertain and unguaranteed. There is 
no guarantee that the peace process would culminate in an independent and viable 
Palestinian state that would achieve the dreams of the people. Perhaps Palestinians should  
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have kept their close coordination with Jordan parallel to their negotiations with Israel. In 
doing so, they would still have received support from Jordan if they did not achieve what 
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